On 08/06/2006 David Härdeman wrote: > I suggest that we use the following logic: > > 1) do vol_id check > > 2) if fstype is swap, we're done > > 3) if fstype is known, complain and exit > > 4) if fstype is unknown, run mkswap
yes, but initially the idea was to only check where we can be absolutely sure that the check has no corner cases. imagine the scenario that /dev/hda2 is your uncrypted homepartition, and for some stupid reason you add it as an encrypted swap partition with random key to /etc/crypttab. in this case we will never find a known fstype on the cryptsetup target device, as the random key will always differ. so the user might trust our checksystem and loose everything, while he/her would have been more careful if no check existed at all. that's why Michael Gebetsroiter and I defined the following checksystem as the best one: - check per default only if we might destroy data - check per default only if the check is secure, has no corner cases - support any other kind of check, but don't activate it per default also, see Checksystem.Doc in /usr/share/doc/cryptsetup/ as a reference. ... jonas -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
