See also:
https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/NetworkManager/NetworkManager/-/issues/751

"Each sandboxing option will need an individual merge requests and be reviewed and discussed one at a time. Patches welcome!"


Am 04.03.23 um 09:16 schrieb Michael Biebl:
Control: tags -1 + upstream

Hi Russel,

it's definitely too late to do that for bookworm, so it will have to wait for trixie.

This also would benefit from upstream feedback and is ideally applied directly to the upstream provided NetworkManager.service.

Could you thus raise this at https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/NetworkManager/NetworkManager/ please?

Michael


Am 04.03.23 um 03:55 schrieb Russell Coker:
Package: network-manager
Version: 1.42.0-1
Severity: normal
Tags: patch

Here is a set of additions to the systemd security policy for this.  I have tested them with wifi networking and they work.  They need more testing before including in Debian.  We may be able to get a few of them at a suitable level
of testing for the freeze but probably not most of them.

[Service]
# no new privs is an obvious one, no setuid programs etc run
NoNewPrivileges=true
# protecting kernel logs should be safe
ProtectKernelLogs=true
# this program does no CG or namespace management
ProtectControlGroups=true
RestrictNamespaces=true
# protecting modules is probably safe
ProtectKernelModules=true
# changing system call arch and personality not needed
SystemCallArchitectures=native
LockPersonality=true
# should be safe probably has no real impact
UMask=077
# tested and seems to work, should be obvious if it breaks thingfs
PrivateTmp=true
# this would obviously break if it was needed, well written programs wont need it
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
# no need for realtime stuff
RestrictRealtime=true
# no need to create SETUID/SETGID programs
RestrictSUIDSGID=true

# not sure it needs rfkill, definitely doesnt need most devices
DeviceAllow=/dev/rfkill
DevicePolicy=closed

# dhcp hostname and ntp should be a different process, right?
ProtectHostname=true
ProtectClock=true

# only needs the @resources group
SystemCallFilter=~@mount @cpu-emulation @debug @raw-io @reboot @swap @obsolete @privileged

# SE Linux does not allow CAP_SYS_CHROOT
CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_SYS_CHROOT




Attachment: OpenPGP_signature
Description: OpenPGP digital signature

Reply via email to