Control: close 985907 0.16.0-1 On Thu 2021-03-25 13:39:00 -0400, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > rnp currently accepts signatures over weak or untrustworthy > cryptographic primitives.
As of 0.16.0, rnp introduces the following relevant safeguards (from
upstream's CHANGELOG.md):
* Mark SHA1 signatures produced later than 2019-01-19, as invalid.
* Mark MD5 signatures produced later than 2012-01-01, as invalid.
* Use SHA1 collision detection code when using SHA1.
While we might debate whether these are the best possible defaults, it's
no longer completely insecure by default.
In addition, rnp now has the following APIs which can adjust the
underlying acceptable security primitives:
rnp_get_security_rule
rnp_add_security_rule
rnp_remove_security_rule
So it's possible to adjust the acceptable security levels directly if
the user wants to nudge the defaults.
I'm not convinced this is the ideal interface, but it should be at least
usable.
--dkg
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