On 2017-11-27 09:22 AM, Peter Palfrader wrote:
> On Mon, 27 Nov 2017, Simon Deziel wrote:
> 
>> On 2017-11-26 03:31 AM, Peter Palfrader wrote:
>>> The apparmor policy for unbound allows access to
>>> /var/lib/unbound/root.key*, but it does not allow access to any
>>> other dynamically updated key the admin might have put there,
>>> such as debian.org.key on DSA infrastructure.
>>>
>>> Please allow access to all key files.
>>
>> Please see the attached patch.
> 
>>    # chrooted paths
>>    /var/lib/unbound/** r,
>> +  owner /var/lib/unbound/*.key* rw,
>>    owner /var/lib/unbound/**/*.key* rw,
> 
> This would allow /var/lib/unbound/root.key "twice", once via root.key,
> once via *.key.

Indeed, this patch should be better, thanks Peter.

commit a3325cb68a361f976f5d75ef1e3ebc3642759c07 (HEAD -> bug882731)
Author: Simon Deziel <si...@sdeziel.info>
Date:   Mon Nov 27 09:25:42 2017 -0500

    Allow accessing and maintaining any trust anchor file, not just the
    root one.
    
    Closes #882731

diff --git a/debian/apparmor-profile b/debian/apparmor-profile
index 624341c..3c36b13 100644
--- a/debian/apparmor-profile
+++ b/debian/apparmor-profile
@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@
   capability sys_chroot,
   capability sys_resource,
 
-  # root trust anchor
-  owner /var/lib/unbound/root.key* rw,
+  # auto trust anchors
+  owner /var/lib/unbound/*.key* rw,
 
   # root hints from dns-data-root
   /usr/share/dns/root.* r,

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