Control: tags -1 - moreinfo ❦ 5 décembre 2014 13:49 +0100, Ivo De Decker <iv...@debian.org> :
> You didn't include the diff for this, which would be relevant for the unblock. > However, if you upload this before Monday Dec 8th, I will review it and, if > appropriate, unblock it. I have just uploaded 1.5.8-2. No change in packaging, only patches BUG/MEDIUM and BUG/MAJOR from upstream. I am attaching the debdiff. Thanks!
diff -Nru haproxy-1.5.8/debian/changelog haproxy-1.5.8/debian/changelog
--- haproxy-1.5.8/debian/changelog 2014-10-31 13:54:12.000000000 +0100
+++ haproxy-1.5.8/debian/changelog 2014-12-07 11:24:54.000000000 +0100
@@ -1,3 +1,25 @@
+haproxy (1.5.8-2) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+ * Cherry-pick the following patches from 1.5.9 release:
+ - 8a0b93bde77e BUG/MAJOR: sessions: unlink session from list on out
+ of memory
+ - bae03eaad40a BUG/MEDIUM: pattern: don't load more than once a pattern
+ list.
+ - 93637b6e8503 BUG/MEDIUM: connection: sanitize PPv2 header length before
+ parsing address information
+ - 8ba50128832b BUG/MAJOR: frontend: initialize capture pointers earlier
+ - 1f96a87c4e14 BUG/MEDIUM: checks: fix conflicts between agent checks and
+ ssl healthchecks
+ - 9bcc01ae2598 BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: force a full GC in case of memory shortage
+ - 909514970089 BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: fix bad ssl context init can cause
+ segfault in case of OOM.
+ * Cherry-pick the following patches from future 1.5.10 release:
+ - 1e89acb6be9b BUG/MEDIUM: payload: ensure that a request channel is
+ available
+ - bad3c6f1b6d7 BUG/MEDIUM: patterns: previous fix was incomplete
+
+ -- Vincent Bernat <ber...@debian.org> Sun, 07 Dec 2014 11:11:21 +0100
+
haproxy (1.5.8-1) unstable; urgency=medium
* New upstream stable release including the following fixes:
diff -Nru haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0001-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-fix-bad-ssl-context-init-can-cause-se.patch haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0001-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-fix-bad-ssl-context-init-can-cause-se.patch
--- haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0001-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-fix-bad-ssl-context-init-can-cause-se.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0001-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-fix-bad-ssl-context-init-can-cause-se.patch 2014-12-07 11:24:54.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From 8de4ecd5f55ee0d45b9cde587af13be980c7a891 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Emeric Brun <eb...@haproxy.comw>
+Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2014 17:35:37 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/9] BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: fix bad ssl context init can cause
+ segfault in case of OOM.
+
+Some SSL context's init functions errors were not handled and
+can cause a segfault due to an incomplete SSL context
+initialization.
+
+This fix must be backported to 1.5.
+(cherry picked from commit 5547615cdac377797ae351a2e024376dbf6d6963)
+---
+ src/ssl_sock.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
+ 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
+index f8bfbe758222..620609f2f445 100644
+--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
++++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
+@@ -2040,15 +2040,29 @@ static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+- SSL_set_connect_state(conn->xprt_ctx);
+- if (objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess)
+- SSL_set_session(conn->xprt_ctx, objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess);
+-
+ /* set fd on SSL session context */
+- SSL_set_fd(conn->xprt_ctx, conn->t.sock.fd);
++ if (!SSL_set_fd(conn->xprt_ctx, conn->t.sock.fd)) {
++ SSL_free(conn->xprt_ctx);
++ conn->xprt_ctx = NULL;
++ conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
++ return -1;
++ }
+
+ /* set connection pointer */
+- SSL_set_app_data(conn->xprt_ctx, conn);
++ if (!SSL_set_app_data(conn->xprt_ctx, conn)) {
++ SSL_free(conn->xprt_ctx);
++ conn->xprt_ctx = NULL;
++ conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ SSL_set_connect_state(conn->xprt_ctx);
++ if (objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess) {
++ if(!SSL_set_session(conn->xprt_ctx, objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess)) {
++ SSL_SESSION_free(objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess);
++ objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.reused_sess = NULL;
++ }
++ }
+
+ /* leave init state and start handshake */
+ conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS | CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN;
+@@ -2065,13 +2079,23 @@ static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+- SSL_set_accept_state(conn->xprt_ctx);
+-
+ /* set fd on SSL session context */
+- SSL_set_fd(conn->xprt_ctx, conn->t.sock.fd);
++ if (!SSL_set_fd(conn->xprt_ctx, conn->t.sock.fd)) {
++ SSL_free(conn->xprt_ctx);
++ conn->xprt_ctx = NULL;
++ conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
++ return -1;
++ }
+
+ /* set connection pointer */
+- SSL_set_app_data(conn->xprt_ctx, conn);
++ if (!SSL_set_app_data(conn->xprt_ctx, conn)) {
++ SSL_free(conn->xprt_ctx);
++ conn->xprt_ctx = NULL;
++ conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ SSL_set_accept_state(conn->xprt_ctx);
+
+ /* leave init state and start handshake */
+ conn->flags |= CO_FL_SSL_WAIT_HS | CO_FL_WAIT_L6_CONN;
+--
+2.1.3
+
diff -Nru haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0002-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-force-a-full-GC-in-case-of-memory-sho.patch haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0002-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-force-a-full-GC-in-case-of-memory-sho.patch
--- haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0002-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-force-a-full-GC-in-case-of-memory-sho.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0002-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-force-a-full-GC-in-case-of-memory-sho.patch 2014-12-07 11:24:54.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+From 1d4f49cb26cf2e7a1ce153d961262c9df58e2bd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Willy Tarreau <w...@1wt.eu>
+Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2014 13:48:58 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/9] BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: force a full GC in case of memory
+ shortage
+
+When memory becomes scarce and openssl refuses to allocate a new SSL
+session, it is worth freeing the pools and trying again instead of
+rejecting all incoming SSL connection. This can happen when some
+memory usage limits have been assigned to the haproxy process using
+-m or with ulimit -m/-v.
+
+This is mostly an enhancement of previous fix and is worth backporting
+to 1.5.
+(cherry picked from commit fba03cdc5ac6e3ca318b34915596cbc0a0dacc55)
+---
+ src/ssl_sock.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
+index 620609f2f445..f50efe504a8e 100644
+--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
++++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
+@@ -2033,9 +2033,16 @@ static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn)
+ /* If it is in client mode initiate SSL session
+ in connect state otherwise accept state */
+ if (objt_server(conn->target)) {
++ int may_retry = 1;
++
++ retry_connect:
+ /* Alloc a new SSL session ctx */
+ conn->xprt_ctx = SSL_new(objt_server(conn->target)->ssl_ctx.ctx);
+ if (!conn->xprt_ctx) {
++ if (may_retry--) {
++ pool_gc2();
++ goto retry_connect;
++ }
+ conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
+ return -1;
+ }
+@@ -2044,6 +2051,10 @@ static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn)
+ if (!SSL_set_fd(conn->xprt_ctx, conn->t.sock.fd)) {
+ SSL_free(conn->xprt_ctx);
+ conn->xprt_ctx = NULL;
++ if (may_retry--) {
++ pool_gc2();
++ goto retry_connect;
++ }
+ conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
+ return -1;
+ }
+@@ -2052,6 +2063,10 @@ static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn)
+ if (!SSL_set_app_data(conn->xprt_ctx, conn)) {
+ SSL_free(conn->xprt_ctx);
+ conn->xprt_ctx = NULL;
++ if (may_retry--) {
++ pool_gc2();
++ goto retry_connect;
++ }
+ conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
+ return -1;
+ }
+@@ -2072,9 +2087,16 @@ static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else if (objt_listener(conn->target)) {
++ int may_retry = 1;
++
++ retry_accept:
+ /* Alloc a new SSL session ctx */
+ conn->xprt_ctx = SSL_new(objt_listener(conn->target)->bind_conf->default_ctx);
+ if (!conn->xprt_ctx) {
++ if (may_retry--) {
++ pool_gc2();
++ goto retry_accept;
++ }
+ conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
+ return -1;
+ }
+@@ -2083,6 +2105,10 @@ static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn)
+ if (!SSL_set_fd(conn->xprt_ctx, conn->t.sock.fd)) {
+ SSL_free(conn->xprt_ctx);
+ conn->xprt_ctx = NULL;
++ if (may_retry--) {
++ pool_gc2();
++ goto retry_accept;
++ }
+ conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
+ return -1;
+ }
+@@ -2091,6 +2117,10 @@ static int ssl_sock_init(struct connection *conn)
+ if (!SSL_set_app_data(conn->xprt_ctx, conn)) {
+ SSL_free(conn->xprt_ctx);
+ conn->xprt_ctx = NULL;
++ if (may_retry--) {
++ pool_gc2();
++ goto retry_accept;
++ }
+ conn->err_code = CO_ER_SSL_NO_MEM;
+ return -1;
+ }
+--
+2.1.3
+
diff -Nru haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0003-BUG-MEDIUM-checks-fix-conflicts-between-agent-checks.patch haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0003-BUG-MEDIUM-checks-fix-conflicts-between-agent-checks.patch
--- haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0003-BUG-MEDIUM-checks-fix-conflicts-between-agent-checks.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0003-BUG-MEDIUM-checks-fix-conflicts-between-agent-checks.patch 2014-12-07 11:24:54.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+From 4aa82d2300e4739eeaeb079fc51f1929508f19c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Cyril=20Bont=C3=A9?= <cyril.bo...@free.fr>
+Date: Sat, 15 Nov 2014 22:41:27 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/9] BUG/MEDIUM: checks: fix conflicts between agent checks
+ and ssl healthchecks
+
+Lasse Birnbaum Jensen reported an issue when agent checks are used at the same
+time as standard healthchecks when SSL is enabled on the server side.
+
+The symptom is that agent checks try to communicate in SSL while it should
+manage raw data. This happens because the transport layer is shared between all
+kind of checks.
+
+To fix the issue, the transport layer is now stored in each check type,
+allowing to use SSL healthchecks when required, while an agent check should
+always use the raw_sock implementation.
+
+The fix must be backported to 1.5.
+(cherry picked from commit 9ce1311ebc834e20addc7a8392c0fc4e4ad687b7)
+---
+ include/types/checks.h | 3 ++-
+ include/types/server.h | 1 -
+ src/checks.c | 2 +-
+ src/server.c | 2 +-
+ src/ssl_sock.c | 2 +-
+ 5 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/types/checks.h b/include/types/checks.h
+index a50043bb68f3..42b7b07c17c2 100644
+--- a/include/types/checks.h
++++ b/include/types/checks.h
+@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ enum {
+ };
+
+ struct check {
++ struct xprt_ops *xprt; /* transport layer operations for health checks */
+ struct connection *conn; /* connection state for health checks */
+ unsigned short port; /* the port to use for the health checks */
+ struct buffer *bi, *bo; /* input and output buffers to send/recv check */
+@@ -132,7 +133,7 @@ struct check {
+ struct timeval start; /* last health check start time */
+ long duration; /* time in ms took to finish last health check */
+ short status, code; /* check result, check code */
+- char desc[HCHK_DESC_LEN]; /* health check descritpion */
++ char desc[HCHK_DESC_LEN]; /* health check description */
+ int use_ssl; /* use SSL for health checks */
+ int send_proxy; /* send a PROXY protocol header with checks */
+ struct tcpcheck_rule *current_step; /* current step when using tcpcheck */
+diff --git a/include/types/server.h b/include/types/server.h
+index 313f58d71dd4..c419b40f9f4a 100644
+--- a/include/types/server.h
++++ b/include/types/server.h
+@@ -194,7 +194,6 @@ struct server {
+
+ struct { /* configuration used by health-check and agent-check */
+ struct protocol *proto; /* server address protocol for health checks */
+- struct xprt_ops *xprt; /* transport layer operations for health checks */
+ struct sockaddr_storage addr; /* the address to check, if different from <addr> */
+ } check_common;
+
+diff --git a/src/checks.c b/src/checks.c
+index 5318f35943c8..84bf0e5d0297 100644
+--- a/src/checks.c
++++ b/src/checks.c
+@@ -1413,7 +1413,7 @@ static int connect_chk(struct task *t)
+
+ /* prepare a new connection */
+ conn_init(conn);
+- conn_prepare(conn, s->check_common.proto, s->check_common.xprt);
++ conn_prepare(conn, s->check_common.proto, check->xprt);
+ conn_attach(conn, check, &check_conn_cb);
+ conn->target = &s->obj_type;
+
+diff --git a/src/server.c b/src/server.c
+index fdb63cc33a2d..94a31b6659be 100644
+--- a/src/server.c
++++ b/src/server.c
+@@ -929,7 +929,7 @@ int parse_server(const char *file, int linenum, char **args, struct proxy *curpr
+
+ newsrv->addr = *sk;
+ newsrv->proto = newsrv->check_common.proto = protocol_by_family(newsrv->addr.ss_family);
+- newsrv->xprt = newsrv->check_common.xprt = &raw_sock;
++ newsrv->xprt = newsrv->check.xprt = newsrv->agent.xprt = &raw_sock;
+
+ if (!newsrv->proto) {
+ Alert("parsing [%s:%d] : Unknown protocol family %d '%s'\n",
+diff --git a/src/ssl_sock.c b/src/ssl_sock.c
+index f50efe504a8e..b73d6f9a9d47 100644
+--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
++++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
+@@ -1812,7 +1812,7 @@ int ssl_sock_prepare_srv_ctx(struct server *srv, struct proxy *curproxy)
+ if (srv->use_ssl)
+ srv->xprt = &ssl_sock;
+ if (srv->check.use_ssl)
+- srv->check_common.xprt = &ssl_sock;
++ srv->check.xprt = &ssl_sock;
+
+ srv->ssl_ctx.ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
+ if (!srv->ssl_ctx.ctx) {
+--
+2.1.3
+
diff -Nru haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0004-BUG-MAJOR-frontend-initialize-capture-pointers-earli.patch haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0004-BUG-MAJOR-frontend-initialize-capture-pointers-earli.patch
--- haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0004-BUG-MAJOR-frontend-initialize-capture-pointers-earli.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0004-BUG-MAJOR-frontend-initialize-capture-pointers-earli.patch 2014-12-07 11:24:54.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From e7623987fda044a3c99cf061e45e51a1457edd69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Willy Tarreau <w...@1wt.eu>
+Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2014 18:49:19 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 4/9] BUG/MAJOR: frontend: initialize capture pointers earlier
+
+Denys Fedoryshchenko reported and diagnosed a nasty bug caused by TCP
+captures, introduced in late 1.5-dev by commit 18bf01e ("MEDIUM: tcp:
+add a new tcp-request capture directive"). The problem is that we're
+using the array of capture pointers initially designed for HTTP usage
+only, and that this array was only reset when starting to process an
+HTTP request. In a tcp-only frontend, the pointers are not reset, and
+if the capture pool is shared, we can very well point to whatever other
+memory location, resulting in random crashes when tcp-request content
+captures are processed.
+
+The fix simply consists in initializing these pointers when the pools
+are prepared.
+
+A workaround for existing versions consists in either disabling TCP
+captures in tcp-only frontends, or in forcing the frontends to work in
+HTTP mode.
+
+Thanks to Denys for the amount of testing and detailed reports.
+
+This fix must be backported to 1.5.
+(cherry picked from commit 9654e57fac86c773091b892f42015ba2ba56be5a)
+---
+ src/frontend.c | 14 ++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/frontend.c b/src/frontend.c
+index 3f80774ded29..29280477b0c3 100644
+--- a/src/frontend.c
++++ b/src/frontend.c
+@@ -106,11 +106,17 @@ int frontend_accept(struct session *s)
+ if (global.tune.client_rcvbuf)
+ setsockopt(cfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &global.tune.client_rcvbuf, sizeof(global.tune.client_rcvbuf));
+
+- if (unlikely(s->fe->nb_req_cap > 0 && (s->txn.req.cap = pool_alloc2(s->fe->req_cap_pool)) == NULL))
+- goto out_return; /* no memory */
++ if (unlikely(s->fe->nb_req_cap > 0)) {
++ if ((s->txn.req.cap = pool_alloc2(s->fe->req_cap_pool)) == NULL)
++ goto out_return; /* no memory */
++ memset(s->txn.req.cap, 0, s->fe->nb_req_cap * sizeof(void *));
++ }
+
+- if (unlikely(s->fe->nb_rsp_cap > 0 && (s->txn.rsp.cap = pool_alloc2(s->fe->rsp_cap_pool)) == NULL))
+- goto out_free_reqcap; /* no memory */
++ if (unlikely(s->fe->nb_rsp_cap > 0)) {
++ if ((s->txn.rsp.cap = pool_alloc2(s->fe->rsp_cap_pool)) == NULL)
++ goto out_free_reqcap; /* no memory */
++ memset(s->txn.rsp.cap, 0, s->fe->nb_rsp_cap * sizeof(void *));
++ }
+
+ if (s->fe->http_needed) {
+ /* we have to allocate header indexes only if we know
+--
+2.1.3
+
diff -Nru haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0005-BUG-MEDIUM-connection-sanitize-PPv2-header-length-be.patch haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0005-BUG-MEDIUM-connection-sanitize-PPv2-header-length-be.patch
--- haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0005-BUG-MEDIUM-connection-sanitize-PPv2-header-length-be.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0005-BUG-MEDIUM-connection-sanitize-PPv2-header-length-be.patch 2014-12-07 11:24:54.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From 86664f6de45d2c1c48bd4b9db7aa5c0de4354325 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: KOVACS Krisztian <hid...@balabit.com>
+Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2014 10:53:20 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 5/9] BUG/MEDIUM: connection: sanitize PPv2 header length
+ before parsing address information
+
+Previously, if hdr_v2->len was less than the length of the protocol
+specific address information we could have read after the end of the
+buffer and initialize the sockaddr structure with junk.
+
+Signed-off-by: KOVACS Krisztian <hid...@balabit.com>
+
+[WT: this is only tagged medium since proxy protocol is only used from
+ trusted sources]
+
+This must be backported to 1.5.
+(cherry picked from commit efd3aa93412648cf923bf3d2e171c0b84e9d7a69)
+---
+ src/connection.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/connection.c b/src/connection.c
+index 3af6d9afd7e9..b9f5c42b44e6 100644
+--- a/src/connection.c
++++ b/src/connection.c
+@@ -424,6 +424,9 @@ int conn_recv_proxy(struct connection *conn, int flag)
+ case 0x01: /* PROXY command */
+ switch (hdr_v2->fam) {
+ case 0x11: /* TCPv4 */
++ if (ntohs(hdr_v2->len) < PP2_ADDR_LEN_INET)
++ goto bad_header;
++
+ ((struct sockaddr_in *)&conn->addr.from)->sin_family = AF_INET;
+ ((struct sockaddr_in *)&conn->addr.from)->sin_addr.s_addr = hdr_v2->addr.ip4.src_addr;
+ ((struct sockaddr_in *)&conn->addr.from)->sin_port = hdr_v2->addr.ip4.src_port;
+@@ -433,6 +436,9 @@ int conn_recv_proxy(struct connection *conn, int flag)
+ conn->flags |= CO_FL_ADDR_FROM_SET | CO_FL_ADDR_TO_SET;
+ break;
+ case 0x21: /* TCPv6 */
++ if (ntohs(hdr_v2->len) < PP2_ADDR_LEN_INET6)
++ goto bad_header;
++
+ ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&conn->addr.from)->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+ memcpy(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&conn->addr.from)->sin6_addr, hdr_v2->addr.ip6.src_addr, 16);
+ ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&conn->addr.from)->sin6_port = hdr_v2->addr.ip6.src_port;
+--
+2.1.3
+
diff -Nru haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0006-BUG-MEDIUM-pattern-don-t-load-more-than-once-a-patte.patch haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0006-BUG-MEDIUM-pattern-don-t-load-more-than-once-a-patte.patch
--- haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0006-BUG-MEDIUM-pattern-don-t-load-more-than-once-a-patte.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0006-BUG-MEDIUM-pattern-don-t-load-more-than-once-a-patte.patch 2014-12-07 11:24:54.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+From a0e753b688853c7ac751bcb183978eba063e68f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Thierry FOURNIER <tfourn...@exceliance.fr>
+Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 11:14:42 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 6/9] BUG/MEDIUM: pattern: don't load more than once a pattern
+ list.
+
+A memory optimization can use the same pattern expression for many
+equal pattern list (same parse method, index method and index_smp
+method).
+
+The pattern expression is returned by "pattern_new_expr", but this
+function dont indicate if the returned pattern is already in use.
+
+So, the caller function reload the list of patterns in addition with
+the existing patterns. This behavior is not a problem with tree indexed
+pattern, but it grows the lists indexed patterns.
+
+This fix add a "reuse" flag in return of the function "pattern_new_expr".
+If the flag is set, I suppose that the patterns are already loaded.
+
+This fix must be backported into 1.5.
+(cherry picked from commit 315ec4217f912f6cc8fcf98624d852f9cd8399f9)
+---
+ include/proto/pattern.h | 3 ++-
+ src/acl.c | 2 +-
+ src/pattern.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/proto/pattern.h b/include/proto/pattern.h
+index 4a969ac199e4..7855474e5b44 100644
+--- a/include/proto/pattern.h
++++ b/include/proto/pattern.h
+@@ -206,7 +206,8 @@ int pattern_read_from_file(struct pattern_head *head, unsigned int refflags, con
+ */
+ void pattern_init_expr(struct pattern_expr *expr);
+ struct pattern_expr *pattern_lookup_expr(struct pattern_head *head, struct pat_ref *ref);
+-struct pattern_expr *pattern_new_expr(struct pattern_head *head, struct pat_ref *ref, char **err);
++struct pattern_expr *pattern_new_expr(struct pattern_head *head, struct pat_ref *ref,
++ char **err, int *reuse);
+ struct sample_storage **pattern_find_smp(struct pattern_expr *expr, struct pat_ref_elt *elt);
+ int pattern_delete(struct pattern_expr *expr, struct pat_ref_elt *ref);
+
+diff --git a/src/acl.c b/src/acl.c
+index 8f3fd9eaa746..d8b3000c0c36 100644
+--- a/src/acl.c
++++ b/src/acl.c
+@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ struct acl_expr *parse_acl_expr(const char **args, char **err, struct arg_list *
+ }
+
+ /* Create new pattern expression associated to this reference. */
+- pattern_expr = pattern_new_expr(&expr->pat, ref, err);
++ pattern_expr = pattern_new_expr(&expr->pat, ref, err, NULL);
+ if (!pattern_expr)
+ goto out_free_expr;
+
+diff --git a/src/pattern.c b/src/pattern.c
+index c63365d74bf7..20547f9607be 100644
+--- a/src/pattern.c
++++ b/src/pattern.c
+@@ -1855,12 +1855,19 @@ struct pattern_expr *pattern_lookup_expr(struct pattern_head *head, struct pat_r
+ * <ref> can be NULL. If an error is occured, the function returns NULL and
+ * <err> is filled. Otherwise, the function returns new pattern_expr linked
+ * with <head> and <ref>.
++ *
++ * The returned value can be a alredy filled pattern list, in this case the
++ * flag <reuse> is set.
+ */
+-struct pattern_expr *pattern_new_expr(struct pattern_head *head, struct pat_ref *ref, char **err)
++struct pattern_expr *pattern_new_expr(struct pattern_head *head, struct pat_ref *ref,
++ char **err, int *reuse)
+ {
+ struct pattern_expr *expr;
+ struct pattern_expr_list *list;
+
++ if (reuse)
++ *reuse = 0;
++
+ /* Memory and initialization of the chain element. */
+ list = malloc(sizeof(*list));
+ if (!list) {
+@@ -1915,6 +1922,8 @@ struct pattern_expr *pattern_new_expr(struct pattern_head *head, struct pat_ref
+ * with ref and we must not free it.
+ */
+ list->do_free = 0;
++ if (reuse)
++ *reuse = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* The new list element reference the pattern_expr. */
+@@ -2087,6 +2096,7 @@ int pattern_read_from_file(struct pattern_head *head, unsigned int refflags,
+ struct pat_ref *ref;
+ struct pattern_expr *expr;
+ struct pat_ref_elt *elt;
++ int reuse;
+
+ /* Lookup for the existing reference. */
+ ref = pat_ref_lookup(filename);
+@@ -2161,12 +2171,20 @@ int pattern_read_from_file(struct pattern_head *head, unsigned int refflags,
+ */
+ expr = pattern_lookup_expr(head, ref);
+ if (!expr || (expr->mflags != patflags)) {
+- expr = pattern_new_expr(head, ref, err);
++ expr = pattern_new_expr(head, ref, err, &reuse);
+ if (!expr)
+ return 0;
+ expr->mflags = patflags;
+ }
+
++ /* The returned expression may be not empty, because the function
++ * "pattern_new_expr" lookup for similar pattern list and can
++ * reuse a already filled pattern list. In this case, we can not
++ * reload the patterns.
++ */
++ if (reuse)
++ return 1;
++
+ /* Load reference content in the pattern expression. */
+ list_for_each_entry(elt, &ref->head, list) {
+ if (!pat_ref_push(elt, expr, patflags, err)) {
+--
+2.1.3
+
diff -Nru haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0007-BUG-MAJOR-sessions-unlink-session-from-list-on-out-o.patch haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0007-BUG-MAJOR-sessions-unlink-session-from-list-on-out-o.patch
--- haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0007-BUG-MAJOR-sessions-unlink-session-from-list-on-out-o.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0007-BUG-MAJOR-sessions-unlink-session-from-list-on-out-o.patch 2014-12-07 11:24:54.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 7f399f63f2d8414c6ef7ebde45db3689ad6453b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Willy Tarreau <w...@1wt.eu>
+Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2014 17:10:33 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 7/9] BUG/MAJOR: sessions: unlink session from list on out of
+ memory
+
+Since embryonic sessions were introduced in 1.5-dev12 with commit
+2542b53 ("MAJOR: session: introduce embryonic sessions"), a major
+bug remained present. If haproxy cannot allocate memory during
+session_complete() (for example, no more buffers), it will not
+unlink the new session from the sessions list. This will cause
+memory corruptions if the memory area from the session is reused
+for anything else, and may also cause bogus output on "show sess"
+on the CLI.
+
+This fix must be backported to 1.5.
+(cherry picked from commit 3b24641745b32289235d765f441ec60fa7381f99)
+---
+ src/session.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/session.c b/src/session.c
+index df85170cd13a..5b9e407118a3 100644
+--- a/src/session.c
++++ b/src/session.c
+@@ -579,6 +579,7 @@ int session_complete(struct session *s)
+ /* and restore the connection pointer in case we destroyed it,
+ * because kill_mini_session() will need it.
+ */
++ LIST_DEL(&s->list);
+ s->target = &conn->obj_type;
+ return ret;
+ }
+--
+2.1.3
+
diff -Nru haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0008-BUG-MEDIUM-patterns-previous-fix-was-incomplete.patch haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0008-BUG-MEDIUM-patterns-previous-fix-was-incomplete.patch
--- haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0008-BUG-MEDIUM-patterns-previous-fix-was-incomplete.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0008-BUG-MEDIUM-patterns-previous-fix-was-incomplete.patch 2014-12-07 11:24:54.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From c14cbb9b8c360b63db24ec50a96625300186fca2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Willy Tarreau <w...@1wt.eu>
+Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 13:17:03 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 8/9] BUG/MEDIUM: patterns: previous fix was incomplete
+
+Dmitry Sivachenko <trtrmi...@gmail.com> reported that commit 315ec42
+("BUG/MEDIUM: pattern: don't load more than once a pattern list.")
+relies on an uninitialised variable in the stack. While it used to
+work fine during the tests, if the uninitialized variable is non-null,
+some patterns may be aggregated if loaded multiple times, resulting in
+slower processing, which was the original issue it tried to address.
+
+The fix needs to be backported to 1.5.
+(cherry picked from commit 4deaf39243c4d941998b1b0175bad05b8a287c0b)
+---
+ src/pattern.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/pattern.c b/src/pattern.c
+index 20547f9607be..208e33a448bd 100644
+--- a/src/pattern.c
++++ b/src/pattern.c
+@@ -2096,7 +2096,7 @@ int pattern_read_from_file(struct pattern_head *head, unsigned int refflags,
+ struct pat_ref *ref;
+ struct pattern_expr *expr;
+ struct pat_ref_elt *elt;
+- int reuse;
++ int reuse = 0;
+
+ /* Lookup for the existing reference. */
+ ref = pat_ref_lookup(filename);
+--
+2.1.3
+
diff -Nru haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0009-BUG-MEDIUM-payload-ensure-that-a-request-channel-is-.patch haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0009-BUG-MEDIUM-payload-ensure-that-a-request-channel-is-.patch
--- haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0009-BUG-MEDIUM-payload-ensure-that-a-request-channel-is-.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/from-upstream/0009-BUG-MEDIUM-payload-ensure-that-a-request-channel-is-.patch 2014-12-07 11:24:54.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From 92a009fca26ed45bb8ad64666a993dcfb86617de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Willy Tarreau <w...@1wt.eu>
+Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 13:24:24 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 9/9] BUG/MEDIUM: payload: ensure that a request channel is
+ available
+
+Denys Fedoryshchenko reported a segfault when using certain
+sample fetch functions in the "tcp-request connection" rulesets
+despite the warnings. This is because some tests for the existence
+of the channel were missing.
+
+The fetches which were fixed are :
+ - req.ssl_hello_type
+ - rep.ssl_hello_type
+ - req.ssl_sni
+
+This fix must be backported to 1.5.
+(cherry picked from commit 83f2592bcd2e186beeabcba16be16faaab82bd39)
+---
+ src/payload.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/payload.c b/src/payload.c
+index 4057f6f85601..f62163c4143c 100644
+--- a/src/payload.c
++++ b/src/payload.c
+@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_hello_type(struct proxy *px, struct session *s, void *l7, unsigned
+
+ chn = ((opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_RES) ? s->rep : s->req;
+
++ if (!chn)
++ goto not_ssl_hello;
++
+ bleft = chn->buf->i;
+ data = (const unsigned char *)chn->buf->p;
+
+@@ -276,6 +279,9 @@ smp_fetch_ssl_hello_sni(struct proxy *px, struct session *s, void *l7, unsigned
+
+ chn = ((opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_RES) ? s->rep : s->req;
+
++ if (!chn)
++ goto not_ssl_hello;
++
+ bleft = chn->buf->i;
+ data = (unsigned char *)chn->buf->p;
+
+--
+2.1.3
+
diff -Nru haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/series haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/series
--- haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/series 2014-10-31 13:54:12.000000000 +0100
+++ haproxy-1.5.8/debian/patches/series 2014-12-07 11:24:54.000000000 +0100
@@ -3,3 +3,12 @@
haproxy.service-add-documentation.patch
haproxy.service-check-config-before-reload.patch
haproxy.service-use-environment-variables.patch
+from-upstream/0001-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-fix-bad-ssl-context-init-can-cause-se.patch
+from-upstream/0002-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-force-a-full-GC-in-case-of-memory-sho.patch
+from-upstream/0003-BUG-MEDIUM-checks-fix-conflicts-between-agent-checks.patch
+from-upstream/0004-BUG-MAJOR-frontend-initialize-capture-pointers-earli.patch
+from-upstream/0005-BUG-MEDIUM-connection-sanitize-PPv2-header-length-be.patch
+from-upstream/0006-BUG-MEDIUM-pattern-don-t-load-more-than-once-a-patte.patch
+from-upstream/0007-BUG-MAJOR-sessions-unlink-session-from-list-on-out-o.patch
+from-upstream/0008-BUG-MEDIUM-patterns-previous-fix-was-incomplete.patch
+from-upstream/0009-BUG-MEDIUM-payload-ensure-that-a-request-channel-is-.patch
--
Write and test a big program in small pieces.
- The Elements of Programming Style (Kernighan & Plauger)
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
