On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 08:56:07PM -0400, Filipus Klutiero wrote: > I am not convinced this is a good thing, but for sure the current > phrasing is incorrect. According to the technical paper, OTR would > merely send the key to the other participant, so only him could forge > messages, unless someone captured the message. So the only person who > can forge messages after the conversation is the other participant. > Since he could already forge messages, that measure does not increase > deniability in normal circumstances.
No, that's not quite right; OTR sends the authentication (MAC) key *in the clear* so that anyone capturing the traffic on the wire can subsequently modify transcripts however they like. -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-bugs-dist-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org
