Portable SCIFs have been around for decades, tent-size and desk-top:
http://cryptome.org/bema-se.htm
More compact and emanation-resistant now. Carry your own.
Entrepreneurs would offer curb-side service, like food carts, or larger
like waste shredders and blood test labs. Yarping and texting on cellphones
in the open, believing privacy policies, faith in crypto, wi-fi, ISPs, VPNs,
HTTPS, Tor, clouds, IoT, is day-dreaming, making sellers rich.
Anything that encourages and supports self-security instead of products,
standards, official protectors, is the right direction.
Quietly clumsy beats drum-beating authorities ever compromising their
users for cohorts.
SCIFs leak, sure, rig fixes, test, retest, minimize use of EMR devices,
don't bet your life on any security, homebrew or top 10.
Have a nice day.
At 05:00 PM 6/23/2016, you wrote:
On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 3:14 AM, Karl Semich
<<mailto:[email protected]>[email protected]> wrote:
I would like to index such places, and create motion towards such
security being accessible for all people.
Attempting to compile such a list would be
laborious and self-defeating. It would invite
compromise of the enumerated "secure" locations. Â
It would be more useful to compile
characteristics of "secure public spaces", and
heuristics for locating them in one's local
environs. How can we tell - without special
equipment etc - if a given space is
monitored? If we land in an unfamiliar city,
how can we correctly "guess" where to find a secure public space?
On a recent trip I discovered a little 3' x 4'
nook in the outside wall of LA's Bonaventure
Hotel. Tho adjacent to areas of high
pedestrian traffic, the nook was unspied by any
cameras. No microphones or other sensors were
visible nearby. A blissful respite from the
otherwise panoptic surveillance of urban California. Â
In this case we might speculatively take the
hotel's Brutalist architecture as the heuristic
for finding similar spaces. Although sometimes
described as an aesthetically "fascist" style,
Brutalist architects loved to create little
difficult-to-surveil nooks & crannies in their
buildings. Alas many of these spaces have been
fenced up by the buildings' current Centrist
owners. For example theÂ
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_Service_Center_(Boston)#/media/File:Government_Service_Center_Boston_P1000474.JPG>contemptible
disfigurement of Boston's magnificent Government Service Center building.
What are other heuristics for finding secure less-surveilled spaces?