I do not like biometric idea at all, because we can change password, but how can I change biometric measurements in the moment, something goes wrong? E.g. digital copy of biometrics is stolen [and that will happen for sure].
Biometic is useless for me. ˜ Tomas On 06 Jun 2014, at 20:17, Gregory Foster <[email protected]> wrote: > Signed PGP part > Federal Business Opportunities (Jun 4) - "Ephemeral Biometrics: An > Alternative to Traditional, Event-based Authentication" by Sandia > National Laboratories: > https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=06e9abca57bdd9dac64902e39f039c4f&tab=core&_cview=0 > > > Sandia National Laboratories is engaged in ongoing research and > > development into transformational upgrades in the area of cyber > > identity management as well as Insider Threat Monitoring by using > > Ephemeral Biometrics (EB). EB is unique because individual > > identities are tied to living biometric data that is active and > > continuous. The purpose of the research is to derive convenient > > authentication techniques (e.g., alternatives to passwords) that > > are both active and continuous while at the same time significantly > > improving authenticity and integrity of cyber identities. > > "Ephemeral Biometrics: What are they and what do they solve?" by Sung > Choi and David Zage of Sandia National Laboratories (2013): > https://www.cs.purdue.edu/homes/zagedj/docs/iccst2013.pdf > > I'm not really sure what's ephemeral about redefining authentication > to mean continuous monitoring. > > This work directly targets insider threat concerns raised > post-Snowden, and provides further evidence that entities obsessed > with secrecy will destroy their own effectiveness in pursuit of an > improbable if not impossible definition of "security" which attempts > to hermetically seal systems that include human beings. > > Good luck with that! > gf > > -- > Gregory Foster || [email protected] > @gregoryfoster <> http://entersection.com/ >
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