At 10:59 AM -0800 3/7/00, Stefan Brands wrote:
>Hi Tim,
>
>> From: Tim May [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
>> Sent: Wednesday, March 01, 2000 8:49 PM
>> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>> Cc: Stefan Brands; Austin Hill
>> > ...
>> >-- Payee traceability protects consumers against remote extortion,
>> >since they can always cooperate with the bank to allow tracing of
>> >their payments to the account of the recipient. (This account may
>> >be anonymous, by the way.)
>>
>> Both payer and payee traceability are no doubt desirable to some...and
>> those who want either one can make contractual arrangements
>> for this. ...
>
>Here you circumvent the major issue by not addressing the concern.
>If the design itself does not prevent it, then the extortion attack
>cannot be prevented; contractual arrangements do not help, clearly.
>Am I correct that you propose that the system should be designed in
>such a way that there is zero protection against remote extortion?
>

Yes.

There are many "bad things" done with money.

I've been writing about untraceable extortion and contract killings since
1988; I talked to Chaum about these issues at Crypto '88, and I am very
well aware of bad things which are made easier--and other bad things which
are made harder--with two-way untraceable digital cash.

Attempting to head off _some_ perceived bad things by building traceability
into digital cash is a strategic mistake, one the market will punish.



--Tim May

---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
ComSec 3DES:   831-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
"Cyphernomicon"             | black markets, collapse of governments.

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