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• • Re: Windows 2000 declared secure Julien WILK
  • Re: Windows 2000 declared secure Jonathan S. Shapiro
  • Re: Windows 2000 declared secure Arnold G. Reinhold
  • Re: Windows 2000 declared secure Jonathan S. Shapiro
  • Re: Windows 2000 declared secure ji
  • Re: Windows 2000 declared secure Steven M. Bellovin
• Treacherous Computing Masterclass: London, November 7th Seth Johnson
• patent free(?) anonymous credential system pre-print R. A. Hettinga
  • Re: patent free(?) anonymous credential system pre-print Adam Back
  • Re: patent free(?) anonymous credential system pre-print Jason Holt
  • "patent free(?) anonymous credential system pre-print" - a simpleattack and other problems Stefan Brands
  • Re: patent free(?) anonymous credential system pre-print Nomen Nescio
  • Re: patent free(?) anonymous credential system pre-print bear
  • Re: patent free(?) anonymous credential system pre-print Bill Frantz
  • Re: patent free(?) anonymous credential system pre-print Marc Branchaud
  • Re: patent free(?) anonymous credential system pre-print Adam Shostack
• E-C Logix: current patent holder for the DigiCash patents? R. A. Hettinga
• Attacks on AES Martin F Krafft
  • RSA Attacks? (was: Attacks on AES) Martin F Krafft
• M-209 for sale on EBay Steve Bellovin
  • Re: M-209 for sale on EBay Jeffrey I. Schiller
  • Re: M-209 for sale on EBay Matt Crawford
  • Re: M-209 for sale on EBay Richard Johnson
  • Re: M-209 for sale? Jim Hughes
  • Re: M-209 for sale on EBay Jim Gillogly
  • Re: M-209 for sale on EBay Arnold G. Reinhold
• more snake oil? [WAS: New uncrackable(?) encryption technique] Udhay Shankar N
  • Re: more snake oil? [WAS: New uncrackable(?) encryption technique] Nicko van Someren
  • Re: more snake oil? [WAS: New uncrackable(?) encryption technique] bear
  • Re: more snake oil? [WAS: New uncrackable(?) encryption technique] Ed Gerck
  • USDOD Stego Solicitation reusch
• STORK CRYPTOGRAPHY WORKSHOP: preliminary program Antoon Bosselaers
• Draft NIST Special Publication 800-38B available for public comment Morris Dworkin
• Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Victor.Duchovni
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Adam Back
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Aram Perez
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Victor.Duchovni
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Ed Gerck
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? bear
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Sidney Markowitz
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Ed Gerck
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Sidney Markowitz
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Wei Dai
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Ed Gerck
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Wei Dai
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Ed Gerck
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Greg Rose
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? bear
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Wei Dai
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Ed Gerck
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Wei Dai
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Ed Gerck
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? David Wagner
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Ed Gerck
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Ed Gerck
  • collision resistance -- Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Ed Gerck
  • Re: collision resistance -- Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? David Wagner
  • Re: collision resistance -- Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Ed Gerck
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? David Wagner
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Ed Gerck
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Ed Gerck
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Victor.Duchovni
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Ed Gerck
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Sidney Markowitz
  • comparing RMAC to AES+CBC-MAC or XCBC (Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks?) Adam Back
  • Re: comparing RMAC to AES+CBC-MAC or XCBC (Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks?) Sidney Markowitz
  • Re: comparing RMAC to AES+CBC-MAC or XCBC (Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks?) Adam Back
  • Re: comparing RMAC to AES+CBC-MAC or XCBC (Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks?) Sidney Markowitz
  • Re: comparing RMAC to AES+CBC-MAC or XCBC (Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks?) Adam Back
  • Re: comparing RMAC to AES+CBC-MAC or XCBC (Re: Why is RMAC resistantto birthday attacks?) Jack Lloyd
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Ed Gerck
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Sidney Markowitz
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Ed Gerck
  • Re: Why is RMAC resistant to birthday attacks? Sidney Markowitz
• 2003 PKI Research Workshop CFP Carl Ellison
• Wired on Lucky's palladium patents... Perry E. Metzger
• palladium presentation - anyone going? Adam Back
  • Re: palladium presentation - anyone going? Arnold G. Reinhold
  • Re: palladium presentation - anyone going? Adam Back
  • Palladium Peter Clay
  • Re: palladium presentation - anyone going? Arnold G. Reinhold
  • Palladium -- trivially weak in hw but "secure in software"?? (Re: palladium presentation - anyone going?) Adam Back
  • Re: Palladium -- trivially weak in hw but "secure in software"?? (Re: palladium presentation - anyone going?) Nelson Minar
  • Re: Palladium -- trivially weak in hw but "secure in software"??(Re: palladium presentation - anyone going?) alan
  • Re: Palladium -- trivially weak in hw but "secure in software"?? (Re: palladium presentation - anyone going?) Rick Wash
  • Re: Palladium -- trivially weak in hw but "secure in software"??(Re: palladium presentation - anyone going?) alan
  • Re: Palladium -- trivially weak in hw but "secure in software"?? (Re: palladium presentation - anyone going?) Tal Garfinkel
  • Re: Palladium -- trivially weak in hw but "secure in software"??(Re: palladium presentation - anyone going?) Arnold G. Reinhold
• QuizID? Marc Branchaud
  • Re: QuizID? Rich Salz
  • Re: QuizID? Adam Shostack
  • Re: QuizID? Nicko van Someren
  • Re: QuizID? bear
  • Re: QuizID? Adam Fields
  • RE: QuizID? Trei, Peter
• ANNOUNCE: PureTLS version 0.9b3 Eric Rescorla
• [IP] Former FBI chief takes on encryption Perry E. Metzger
• [Bruce Schneier <[email protected]>] CRYPTO-GRAM, October 15, 2002 Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: [Bruce Schneier <[email protected]>] CRYPTO-GRAM,October 15, 2002 Bill Frantz
  • Re: [Bruce Schneier <[email protected]>] CRYPTO-GRAM, October15, 2002 Pete Chown
  • Re: [Bruce Schneier <[email protected]>] CRYPTO-GRAM, October 15, 2002 Sidney Markowitz
  • Re: [Bruce Schneier <[email protected]>] CRYPTO-GRAM, October 15, 2002 Greg Rose
  • RE: [Bruce Schneier <[email protected]>] CRYPTO-GRAM, October 15, 2002 Dean, James
• Crypto in court Friday Russell Nelson
• Digital Identity Forum programme R. A. Hettinga
• Input requested for second edition of "Firewalls and Internet Security" Steve Bellovin
• CFP -- IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Steve Bellovin
• Mitnick starts security company R. A. Hettinga
• CFP: Security in Distributed Computing Special Track of PODC 2003 Amir Herzberg
  • US DOD Crypto related SBIRS reusch
• open source CAs? Perry E. Metzger
  • Re: open source CAs? Leif Johansson
  • Re: open source CAs? Stefan Mink
  • Re: open source CAs? Stefan Kelm
  • Re: open source CAs? Joris Ballet
  • Re: open source CAs? Michael H. Warfield
  • Re: open source CAs? Derek Atkins
  • Re: open source CAs? Henrik Andreasson
  • RE: open source CAs? Graeme . Burnett
• Microsoft marries RSA Security to Windows R. A. Hettinga
  • Re: Microsoft marries RSA Security to Windows Roy M . Silvernail
  • Re: Microsoft marries RSA Security to Windows Joseph Ashwood
  • Re: Microsoft marries RSA Security to Windows bear
  • Re: Microsoft marries RSA Security to Windows Dan Riley
  • Re: Microsoft marries RSA Security to Windows Ed Gerck
  • Re: Microsoft marries RSA Security to Windows Arnold G. Reinhold
  • Re: Microsoft marries RSA Security to Windows Ed Gerck
  • Re: Microsoft marries RSA Security to Windows Arnold G. Reinhold
  • Re: Microsoft marries RSA Security to Windows Ed Gerck
  • Re: Microsoft marries RSA Security to Windows Roy M. Silvernail
• [OT Canute] Re: [LINK] [Fwd: Interesting KPMG report on DRM] Trei, Peter
• Proofs of security R. A. Hettinga
• Re: [LINK] [Fwd: Interesting KPMG report on DRM] Robin Whittle
• Interesting KPMG report on DRM Peter Gutmann
• Net Security Interview with Jon Callas R. A. Hettinga
• new copyright bill... Perry E. Metzger
• cryptome.org Loughry, Joe
• Confidentiality as a goal of old telegraph codes Steve Bellovin
• The 3rd Annual Consult Hyperion Digital Identity Forum R. A. Hettinga
  • Re: The 3rd Annual Consult Hyperion Digital Identity Forum R. A. Hettinga
  • Re: The 3rd Annual Consult Hyperion Digital Identity Forum David G.W. Birch
• [dgc.chat] New Release of NeuDist R. A. Hettinga
• JYA ping R. A. Hettinga
  • RE: JYA ping R. A. Hettinga
  • RE: JYA ping R. A. Hettinga
• Quantum cryptography takes to the skies Udhay Shankar N
• ECHELON news Udhay Shankar N
• VeriSign Sells CALEA-Ware to Arrival, Cellular Mobile Systems,and First Cellular R. A. Hettinga
• Re: What email encryption is actually in use? Bill Stewart
  • Re: What email encryption is actually in use? Jeremey Barrett
  • Re: What email encryption is actually in use? Matthew Byng-Maddick
  • Re: What email encryption is actually in use? Jeremey Barrett
  • Re: What email encryption is actually in use? John Saylor
  • Re: What email encryption is actually in use? Ben Laurie
  • Re: What email encryption is actually in use? bear
  • Re: What email encryption is actually in use? Udhay Shankar N
  • Re: What email encryption is actually in use? Jeremey Barrett
  • Re: What email encryption is actually in use? Paul Krumviede
  • Re: What email encryption is actually in use? RL 'Bob' Morgan
  • Re: What email encryption is actually in use? Jeremey Barrett
  • Re: What email encryption is actually in use? Steven M. Bellovin
  • Re: What email encryption is actually in use? Adam Shostack
  • Re: What email encryption is actually in use? Simon Josefsson
  • RE: What email encryption is actually in use? Lucky Green
  • RE: What email encryption is actually in use? Udhay Shankar N
• Optical analog computing? R. A. Hettinga
  • Re: Optical analog computing? John S. Denker
  • Re: Optical analog computing? Greg Rose
  • Re: Optical analog computing? David Honig
  • Re: Optical analog computing? Steven M. Bellovin
  • Gaelic Code Talkers Bill Frantz
  • Re: Gaelic Code Talkers bear
  • Re: Gaelic Code Talkers Bill Stewart
  • Re: Gaelic Code Talkers John Kelsey
• Cryptome Carsten Kuckuk
• Operation RoadDevil: Secret Service probes wireless networks inWashington R. A. Hettinga
• Real-world steganography Peter Gutmann
  • Re: Real-world steganography Paul Krumviede
  • Re: Real-world steganography Adam Shostack
  • Re: Real-world steganography Jeremey Barrett
  • Re: Real-world steganography Paul Krumviede
  • Re: Real-world steganography Bram Cohen
  • Re: Real-world steganography Bill Stewart
  • Re: Real-world steganography Ben Laurie
  • Re: Real-world steganography Sampo Syreeni
• [SIMSOFT] machine shop -Biometrics Slouches Toward the Mainstream R. A. Hettinga
  • Re: [SIMSOFT] machine shop -Biometrics Slouches Toward theMainstream Bill Frantz
  • Re: [SIMSOFT] machine shop -Biometrics Slouches Toward the Mainstream David Honig
• RSA's RC5-64 Secret Key Challenge has been solved. Trei, Peter
  • Re: RSA's RC5-64 Secret Key Challenge has been solved. John Gilmore
  • RE: RSA's RC5-64 Secret Key Challenge has been solved. Lucky Green
  • RE: RSA's RC5-64 Secret Key Challenge has been solved. Peter Clay
  • Re: RSA's RC5-64 Secret Key Challenge has been solved. Ralf-P. Weinmann
  • Re: RSA's RC5-64 Secret Key Challenge has been solved. Greg Rose
  • Re: RSA's RC5-64 Secret Key Challenge has been solved. Bill Stewart
  • RE: RSA's RC5-64 Secret Key Challenge has been solved. Trei, Peter
• [CYBERIA] Call for Chapters for book series R. A. Hettinga
• FIB workstation photos Peter Gutmann
• [Werner Koch <[email protected]>] GnuPG 1.2 released Perry E. Metzger
• Don Coppersmith questions Courtois and Pieprzyk AES results Perry E. Metzger

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