At 5:21 PM -0800 3/3/03, Ed Gerck wrote: >Henry Norr had an interesting article today at >http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/03/03/BU1227 >67.DTL&type=business > >Printing a paper receipt that the voter can see is a proposal that addresses >one of the major weaknesses of electronic voting. However, it creates >problems that are even harder to solve than the silent subversion of >e-records. > >For example, using the proposed system a voter can easily, by using a >small concealed camera or a cell phone with a camera, obtain a copy of >that receipt and use it to get money for the vote, or keep the job. And >no one would know or be able to trace it.
The best counter to this problem is widely available systems to produce fake photos of the vote, so the vote buyer can't know whether the votes he sees in the photo are the real votes, or fake ones. The easiest way to implement is to let people photograph the paper on the sample/practice -- not for real voting -- machine that poll workers use to teach voters how to use the real machines. Cheers - Bill ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | Due process for all | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | used to be the | 16345 Englewood Ave. [EMAIL PROTECTED] | American way. | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
