At 06:02 AM 9/17/2002 +0000, David Wagner wrote: >I wasn't thinking of pure software solutions. I was thinking of a >combination of existing hardware + new software: use the MMU to provide >separate address spaces, and use a secure VM or OS kernel to limit what >those processes can do. As far as I can see, this can provide just as >much protection against viruses for your bank account as Palladium can. > >In general, with software and existing hardware working together, I >suspect we can already do everything Palladium can do, except for the DRM >and related applications founded on taking control away from the owner >of the machine. Maybe I'm missing something. Still, it seems to me that >Palladium would much more compelling if it left out the tamper-resistant >chip and gave up on the semi-coercive DRM-like applications.
couple refs to multics study http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#8 Backdoor in AES ? http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#10 Backdoor in AES ? -- Anne & Lynn Wheeler [EMAIL PROTECTED], http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/ --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
