> > Businesses today could > > reasonably be content with their 1024-bit keys, and military institutions > > and those paranoid enough to fear from them should have upgraded years ago. > > > > To me, the big news in Lucky Green's announcement is not that he believes > > that Bernstein's research is sufficiently worrisome as to warrant revoking > > his 1024-bit keys; it's that, in 2002, he still has 1024-bit keys to revoke. > > Does anyone else notice the contradiction in these two paragraphs? > First Bruce says that businesses can reasonably be content with 1024 bit > keys, then he appears shocked that Lucky Green still has a 1024 bit key? > Why is it so awful for Lucky to "still" have a key of this size, if 1024 > bit keys are good enough to be "reasonably content" about?
No contradiction at all. "[M]ilitary institutions and those paranoid enough to fear from them should have upgraded years ago." Anyone paranoid enough to think Bernstein's back-of-the-very-large-envelope calculation makes a 1024-bit key insecure should have already been concerned enough to think that SOMEthing would do so. --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
