By the way, we've recently been planning our next crypto-capabilities
design for the TahoeLAFS secure distributed filesystem. This
involves deciding whether a 192-bit elliptic curve public key is
strong enough, as well as subtler and more unusual issues involving
embedding keys directly into filehandles or URLS, multiple-targets
attacks, and a novel public key scheme that I invented (and that
therefore I think we shouldn't use):
http://allmydata.org/pipermail/tahoe-dev/2009-July/002314.html
Your comments would be appreciated! I've added
[email protected] and [email protected] to the list of
addresses that can post to tahoe-dev without being subscribed.
Regards,
Zooko
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