jerryshao commented on code in PR #10696:
URL: https://github.com/apache/gravitino/pull/10696#discussion_r3091493492
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design-docs/cache-improvement-design.md:
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+# Gravitino Cache Improvement Design
+
+---
+
+## 1. Background
+
+### 1.1 System Overview
+
+Gravitino is a unified metadata management control plane. Compute engines
(Spark, Flink, Trino)
+call it during query planning to resolve catalog, schema, and table metadata,
and to verify
+user permissions. The access pattern is distinctly **read-heavy,
write-light**: DDL operations
+are infrequent, and metadata is resolved once per job.
+
+Gravitino is evolving from single-node to multi-node active-active HA
deployment. Each node
+currently maintains its own independent in-process Caffeine cache with no
cross-node
+synchronisation. Under HA, any write on one node leaves other nodes' caches
stale until TTL
+expiry.
+
+---
+
+### 1.2 Current Cache Architecture Overview
+
+Gravitino maintains three distinct caching layers for the authorization path:
+
+```
+┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Layer 3: Per-request cache (AuthorizationRequestContext) │
+│ Scope: one HTTP request; prevents duplicate auth calls │
+├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
+│ Layer 2: Auth policy caches (JcasbinAuthorizer) │
+│ loadedRoles Cache<Long, Boolean> hook update/TTL │
+│ ownerRel Cache<Long, Optional<Long>> hook update/TTL │
+├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
+│ Layer 1: Entity store cache (RelationalEntityStore) │
+│ CaffeineEntityCache — or NoOpsCache when disabled │
+│ Caches entity reads and relation queries for all modules │
+│ Controlled by Configs.CACHE_ENABLED │
+└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+```
+
+**JCasbin is the core of the auth cache system.** It maintains an in-memory
policy table:
+
+```
+(roleId, objectType, metadataId, privilege) → ALLOW | DENY
+```
+
+The Layer 2 caches exist solely to manage JCasbin's policy loading lifecycle:
+
+| Cache | Role
|
+|-----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| `loadedRoles: Cache<Long, Boolean>` | Tracks which roles are already
loaded into JCasbin — prevents repeated [C2]+[C3] queries on every auth request
|
+| `ownerRel: Cache<Long, Optional<Long>>` | Caches owner lookups — **prevents
[D1] on every auth request** (2–4 `isOwner()` calls per request, see §1.3.2) |
+
+Without `loadedRoles`, every auth request would re-execute N DB queries to
reload all of a
+user's role policies into JCasbin. These two caches are the reason the auth
path is fast on
+the warm path. Layer 1 (entity cache) additionally accelerates the name→ID
resolution calls
+([A], [B], [C1]) that feed into JCasbin's enforce call.
+
+---
+
+#### 1.2.1 Problems with the Current Entity Cache
+
+**The entity cache (Layer 1) has accumulated significant complexity and is not
well-suited to
+serve as a general-purpose or auth-dedicated caching layer.**
+
+##### Mixed responsibilities make it hard to maintain
+
+`CaffeineEntityCache` uses a single `Cache<EntityCacheRelationKey,
List<Entity>>` to store
+three semantically different kinds of data:
+
+| Stored data | Key form |
Example relation types |
+|-------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
+| Direct entity | `(nameIdentifier, entityType, null)` |
any entity: catalog, schema, table, user, role, ... |
+| Relation result set | `(nameIdentifier, entityType, relType)` |
`ROLE_USER_REL`, `TAG_METADATA_OBJECT_REL`, ... |
+| Reverse index entries | `ReverseIndexCache` (separate radix tree) |
entity → list of cache keys that reference it |
+
+On top of this, a `cacheIndex` (radix tree) keeps a prefix-indexed view of all
keys to
+support cascading invalidation. The resulting invalidation logic
(`invalidateEntities`) is a
+BFS traversal that walks both the forward index and the reverse index, making
it difficult to
+reason about correctness and hard to extend safely.
+
+The five relation types currently tracked (`METADATA_OBJECT_ROLE_REL`,
`ROLE_USER_REL`,
+`ROLE_GROUP_REL`, `POLICY_METADATA_OBJECT_REL`, `TAG_METADATA_OBJECT_REL`) are
all
+auth-related, which reflects the original design intent: **the entity cache
was built
+primarily to serve the auth path.** Over time it accumulated relation types
and reverse-index
+logic without a clear ownership model, making it harder to maintain and evolve.
+
+##### Limited benefit for non-auth interfaces
+
+For general metadata API calls (list catalogs, list schemas, list tables), the
entity cache
+provides minimal benefit:
+
+| Operation | Goes through cache? | Notes
|
+|------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
+| `list(namespace, type)` | **No** | Bypasses cache
entirely; always hits DB |
+| `get(ident, type)` (single entity) | Yes | Cache helps on
repeated reads of the same entity |
+| `update(ident, type)` | Invalidate only | Invalidates
entry, write always goes to DB |
+| `listEntitiesByRelation(...)` | Yes | Only for the five
auth-centric relation types |
+
+In practice, the most common metadata browsing operations (`LIST` endpoints)
are not cached
+at the entity store level. The cache's real workload is the auth path, where
the same user
+entity, role assignments, and resource IDs are resolved on every single
authorization check.
+
+**Conclusion:** The entity cache is a de-facto auth cache dressed up as a
general-purpose
+cache. Its complexity is unjustified for the non-auth use case, and its
TTL-based consistency
+model is insufficient for the auth use case (see §1.8). A purpose-built auth
cache layer —
+separate from the entity store — is the cleaner path forward.
+
+---
+
+### 1.3 JCasbin Authorization — Deep Dive
+
+#### 1.3.1 Call Graph for a Single `authorize()` Check
+
+```
+JcasbinAuthorizer.authorize(principal, metalake, metadataObject, privilege)
+│
+├─ [A] getUserEntity(username, metalake)
+│ entityStore.get(USER by NameIdentifier)
+│ → Needed to obtain integer userId for JCasbin enforce()
+│
+├─ [B] MetadataIdConverter.getID(metadataObject, metalake) ← TARGET
RESOURCE
+│ entityStore.get(entity by NameIdentifier)
+│ → Needed to get integer metadataId for JCasbin enforce()
+│ → Called on every auth request
+│
+├─ [C] loadRolePrivilege(metalake, username, userId, requestContext)
+│ │ (guarded by requestContext.hasLoadRole — runs once per HTTP request)
+│ │
+│ ├─ [C1] entityStore.listEntitiesByRelation(ROLE_USER_REL, userIdentifier)
+│ │ → Get all roles assigned to this user
+│ │
+│ └─ For each role NOT already in loadedRoles cache:
+│ ├─ [C2] entityStore.get(RoleEntity by name) ← async, thread pool
+│ └─ loadPolicyByRoleEntity(roleEntity)
+│ └─ For each securableObject in role.securableObjects():
+│ ├─ [C3] MetadataIdConverter.getID(securableObject, metalake)
+│ └─ enforcer.addPolicy(roleId, objType, metadataId, privilege,
effect)
+│
+│ loadedRoles.put(roleId, true) ← mark role as loaded
+│
+├─ [D] isOwner() / loadOwnerPolicy(...) ← called on EVERY auth request (not
only OWNER
+│ │ privilege checks). Nearly all auth expressions contain ANY(OWNER,
METALAKE, CATALOG),
+│ │ which expands to METALAKE::OWNER || CATALOG::OWNER || … and calls
isOwner() directly
+│ │ via OGNL, independently of the authorize() path. Typical call count:
2–4 per request.
+│ ├─ Check ownerRel cache → if HIT, return (most non-owner users get
Optional.empty())
+│ └─ [D1] entityStore.listEntitiesByRelation(OWNER_REL, ...)
+│ ownerRel.put(metadataId, Optional.of(ownerId))
+│
+└─ [E] enforcer.enforce(userId, objectType, metadataId, privilege) ←
in-memory, O(1)
+```
+
+#### 1.3.2 What Each Cache Protects
+
+`loadedRoles: Cache<Long, Boolean>` — answers "is this role's policy already
in JCasbin?"
+Without it, every request re-executes [C2]+[C3] for all roles the user has
(N+1 queries).
+With it, [C2]+[C3] only run on first load per role. **This is the most
critical cache.**
+
+`ownerRel: Cache<Long, Optional<Long>>` — caches ownership lookups for
OWNER-privilege
+checks. **Contrary to initial analysis, `ownerRel` is consulted on virtually
every auth
+request**, not only when `privilege == OWNER`. The reason is that nearly every
authorization
+expression in `AuthorizationExpressionConstants` includes `ANY(OWNER,
METALAKE, CATALOG)`
+or similar clauses (e.g. `LOAD_TABLE_AUTHORIZATION_EXPRESSION`,
+`FILTER_TABLE_AUTHORIZATION_EXPRESSION`,
`LOAD_CATALOG_AUTHORIZATION_EXPRESSION`). The
+`ANY(OWNER, …)` macro expands to `METALAKE::OWNER || CATALOG::OWNER || …`, and
each
+`X::OWNER` term calls `isOwner()` directly — a code path that is **independent
of
+`authorize()`**. As a result, every auth request triggers 2–4 `isOwner()`
calls (one per
+ancestor level), each consulting `ownerRel`. For most non-owner users,
`ownerRel` caches
+`Optional.empty()`, which lets the ownership sub-check fail quickly without a
DB query.
+Without `ownerRel`, every auth request would add 2–4 extra DB queries against
`owner_meta`.
+
+**What these caches do NOT protect** (hit DB on every auth request without
entity cache):
+
+| Call | Description
| Protected by |
+|----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------|
+| [A] `getUserEntity()` | Fetch User entity → get
integer userId | Entity cache only |
+| [B] `MetadataIdConverter.getID()` target | Resolve target resource name
→ integer ID | Entity cache only |
+| [C1] `listEntitiesByRelation(ROLE_USER_REL)` | Get user's role list
| Entity cache only |
+
+---
+
+### 1.4 Impact of Disabling Entity Cache
+
+Layer 2 sits **on top of** Layer 1. When Layer 1 is disabled (NoOpsCache),
calls [A], [B],
+[C1] hit DB on every auth request.
+
+| Call | With entity cache
| Without entity cache |
+|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|
+| [A] `getUserEntity()` | Cache hit after first
request | **DB query every auth request** |
+| [B] `MetadataIdConverter.getID()` target | Cache hit after first
request | **DB query every auth request** |
+| [C1] `listEntitiesByRelation(ROLE_USER_REL)` | Cache hit after first
request | **DB query every auth request** |
+| [C2] `entityStore.get(RoleEntity)` | Protected by
`loadedRoles` | DB only on cold role load |
+| [C3] `MetadataIdConverter.getID()` per privilege | Protected by
`loadedRoles` | DB only on cold role load |
+| [D1] `listEntitiesByRelation(OWNER_REL)` | Protected by `ownerRel`
| **DB query 2–4x per request** |
+
+---
+
+
+## 2. Goals
+
+### 2.1 The Two Problems to Solve
+
+**Problem 1 — Performance:** With entity cache disabled, [A] and [C1] hit DB
on every auth
+request. The new auth cache layer must protect these without relying on entity
store cache.
+([B] also hits DB, but this is correct and acceptable — see §1.5.)
+
+**Problem 2 — Consistency:** `loadedRoles` is TTL-bounded (1 hour staleness)
and updated by hook with in a instance. Permission
+changes must take effect at the next auth request, not after TTL expiry.
+
+Both problems are solved by the same mechanism: a version-validated cache for
the user's role
+list (userId comes for free from the same query).
+
+### 2.2 Requirements
+
+| Goal | Requirement
|
+|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| HA auth consistency | Privilege revocations visible on all nodes
at the next auth request |
+| Auth self-sufficiency | [A] and [C1] protected without relying on
entity store cache |
+| Auth performance | Hot path: ≤ 3 lightweight DB queries
|
+| No new mandatory infrastructure | Solution requires only the existing DB
|
+| Incremental delivery | Phase 1 independently shippable
|
+
+---
+
+## 3. Industry Reference
+
+### 3.1 Apache Polaris — Per-Entity Version Tracking
+
+#### Schema
+
+All entity types (catalogs, namespaces, tables, roles, principals) share a
single `ENTITIES`
+table (single-table inheritance). The two version columns are the key fields
for caching:
+
+```sql
+ENTITIES (
+ id BIGINT, -- Unique entity ID
+ catalog_id BIGINT, -- Owning catalog (0 for top-level entities)
+ parent_id BIGINT, -- Parent entity ID, forms the hierarchy
tree
+ type_code INT, -- Entity type enum (see hierarchy below)
+ name VARCHAR,
+ entity_version INT, -- Bumped on rename / property update /
drop ← key
+ sub_type_code INT, -- Subtype (ICEBERG_TABLE, ICEBERG_VIEW,
etc.)
+ properties JSON, -- User-visible properties (location,
format, etc.)
+ internal_properties JSON, -- Internal properties (credentials,
storage config, etc.)
+ grant_records_version INT, -- Bumped on every GRANT or REVOKE
← key
+)
+
+GRANT_RECORDS (
+ securable_catalog_id BIGINT,
+ securable_id BIGINT, -- The resource being secured
(table/namespace/catalog)
+ grantee_catalog_id BIGINT,
+ grantee_id BIGINT, -- The principal or role receiving the grant
+ privilege_code INT -- One of 102 defined privileges
+)
+```
+
+`GRANT_RECORDS` has no version column of its own. The version fingerprint is
stored in
+`ENTITIES.grant_records_version` — detecting staleness requires no scan of
`GRANT_RECORDS`.
+
+#### Entity Type Hierarchy
+
+```
+ROOT
+ ├── PRINCIPAL (user account, isGrantee)
+ ├── PRINCIPAL_ROLE (user-level role, isGrantee)
+ └── CATALOG
+ ├── CATALOG_ROLE (catalog-level role, isGrantee)
+ ├── NAMESPACE
+ │ └── TABLE_LIKE / POLICY / FILE
+ └── TASK
+```
+
+Only `PRINCIPAL`, `PRINCIPAL_ROLE`, and `CATALOG_ROLE` are **grantees** (can
receive grants).
+All others are **securables** (privileges are set on them).
+
+#### How `grantRecordsVersion` Is Maintained
+
+Every `grantPrivilege` / `revokePrivilege` call performs three writes in **one
DB transaction**:
+
+1. Insert or delete the `GRANT_RECORDS` row.
+2. Increment `grant_records_version` on the **grantee** entity row.
+3. Increment `grant_records_version` on the **securable** entity row.
+
+Both sides are bumped atomically — no separate changelog table is needed.
+
+#### Version-Validated Cache
+
+The cache unit is `ResolvedPolarisEntity` = entity metadata + grant records in
both directions.
+On every request, `bulkValidate()` issues one batch query for all path
entities:
+
+```sql
+SELECT * FROM ENTITIES WHERE (catalog_id, id) IN ((?, ?), ...)
+```
+
+| Path | Condition | Action
|
+|-------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------------|
+| Cache hit | Both versions current | Serve from cache — **0
extra queries** |
+| Stale, targeted refresh | Either version behind | Reload only the changed
dimension |
+| Cache miss | Not in cache | Full load
|
+
+The DB is the single source of truth; no broadcast is needed for correctness.
+
+**Key difference from Gravitino:** Polaris bundles entity + grants in one
cached object, so one
+batch query covers both dimensions. Gravitino separates user→role from
role→privilege, requiring
+2 version-check queries on a warm hit (see §4.7 Step 1 and Step 3). Both
achieve strong
+consistency.
+
+### 3.2 Other References
+
+**Nessie** — HTTP fan-out invalidation: async POST to peer nodes on write,
convergence < 200 ms.
+
+**Keycloak** — JGroups embedded cluster messaging: in-JVM broadcast, no
separate service.
+Recommended future direction if Gravitino needs stronger delivery guarantees.
+
+**DB version polling** — monotonic counters incremented in write transaction;
a background
+thread polls for version changes and proactively invalidates caches.
Considered but not
+adopted; per-request validation (§4.7) achieves strong consistency without
background threads.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Design
+
+### 4.1 Design Overview
+
+Three caches drive auth performance: the user/group → role mapping, entity
name → integer ID,
+and ownership lookups. Each has different access frequency, mutation rate, and
security impact
+— and consequently a different consistency model.
+
+**Consistency tier 1 — strong (version-validated):** User-role assignments and
role-privilege
+definitions are security-critical. A revoked permission must not be served
from cache even one
+second after revocation. Each auth request issues two lightweight
version-check queries against
+`user_meta`, `group_meta`, and `role_meta`. If any `updated_at` timestamp has
advanced since
+the cached value, only the stale portion is reloaded. Staleness window:
**zero**.
+
+**Consistency tier 2 — eventual (write-path hook + change poller):** Entity
name→ID mappings
+and ownership records change far less frequently (DDL, ownership transfers)
and a brief window
+of inconsistency has lower security impact. The local node sees changes
immediately via hooks
+that fire after transaction commit. HA peer nodes converge within the change
poll interval
+(default 1 s) via two lightweight poll queries. No external infrastructure
(Kafka, Redis) is
+required — the existing DB is the single source of truth for both tiers.
+
+---
+
+### 4.1.1 Current-vs-Target Gap (Code-Aligned)
+
+The design below intentionally closes concrete gaps in the current
implementation:
+
+| Area | Current behavior (main branch)
| Target behavior (this design)
|
+|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Role loading |
`JcasbinAuthorizer.loadRolePrivilege()` loads only `ROLE_USER_REL` |
Load both user direct roles and group-derived roles (`group_role_rel`)
|
+| Owner check path | `isOwner()` calls
`MetadataIdConverter.getID()` twice for the same object | Resolve metadata ID
once per call path and reuse |
+| Role cache coherence | `loadedRoles: Cache<Long, Boolean>`
is TTL-driven | `loadedRoles: roleId -> updated_at`
with per-request version validation |
+| Cross-node entity/owner invalidation | In-process hook/TTL only, no durable
HA invalidation stream | DB-backed pollers
(`owner_meta.updated_at`, `entity_change_log`) with targeted invalidation |
+| Request-scope dedup | `AuthorizationRequestContext` has
allow/deny result cache + `hasLoadRole` | Add request-scope owner/id dedup maps
with strict request-thread scope |
+
+This section is used as implementation acceptance criteria and should stay
synchronized with code
+changes in `server-common/.../JcasbinAuthorizer.java`,
+`server-common/.../MetadataIdConverter.java`, and
`core/.../AuthorizationRequestContext.java`.
+
+---
+
+### 4.2 Strong Consistency: User, Group, and Role Caches
+
+#### Why Strong Consistency Is Required
+
+Privilege revocations are the primary security enforcement operation. If a
user's role is
+revoked or a role's privilege is removed, the change must take effect on the
**next** auth
+request on any node, not after TTL expiry. TTL-only caching is fundamentally
unable to
+provide this guarantee.
+
+The chosen approach is Polaris-style per-request version validation: each row
in `user_meta`,
+`group_meta`, and `role_meta` carries an `updated_at` timestamp set in the
same DB transaction
+as the security write. On every auth request, the authorizer fetches these
timestamps and
+compares them against cached values. A mismatch triggers a targeted reload of
only the changed
+entry — not a full policy flush.
+
+Groups are **not optional**: a user can belong to a group that itself holds
role assignments.
+`group_meta.updated_at` receives the same treatment as `user_meta.updated_at`,
so group-role
+changes are immediately reflected everywhere.
+
+Using a timestamp instead of a monotonic counter has a theoretical
same-millisecond collision
+risk (two writes within 1 ms yield the same value → cache misses the second
change), but this
+is negligible for administrative operations (GRANT/REVOKE) in practice.
+
+#### Schema Changes
+
+```sql
+-- Role privilege tracking (strong consistency — Step 3 version check)
+ALTER TABLE `role_meta`
+ ADD COLUMN `updated_at` BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
+ COMMENT 'Set to currentTimeMillis() on any privilege grant/revoke for this
role.
+ JcasbinAuthorizer compares db.updated_at vs cached updated_at per
request
+ to decide whether to reload JCasbin policies for this role.';
+
+-- User role assignment tracking (strong consistency — Step 1a version check)
+ALTER TABLE `user_meta`
+ ADD COLUMN `updated_at` BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
+ COMMENT 'Set to currentTimeMillis() on any role assign/revoke for this
user.
+ JcasbinAuthorizer compares db.updated_at vs cached updated_at per
request
+ to decide whether to reload the user-role mapping.';
+
+-- Group role assignment tracking (strong consistency — Step 1b version check)
+ALTER TABLE `group_meta`
+ ADD COLUMN `updated_at` BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
+ COMMENT 'Set to currentTimeMillis() on any role assign/revoke for this
group.
+ JcasbinAuthorizer compares db.updated_at vs cached updated_at per
request
+ to decide whether to reload the group-role mapping.';
+```
+
+#### Index and Backfill Notes
+
+To keep Step 1 and Step 3 checks predictable under load, add/verify covering
indexes for
+high-frequency predicates:
+
+```sql
+-- Suggested read-path indexes for version checks
+CREATE INDEX idx_user_meta_name_del_upd
+ ON user_meta (metalake_id, user_name, deleted_at, updated_at);
+CREATE INDEX idx_group_meta_del_upd
+ ON group_meta (group_id, deleted_at, updated_at);
+CREATE INDEX idx_role_meta_del_upd
+ ON role_meta (role_id, deleted_at, updated_at);
+CREATE INDEX idx_owner_meta_obj_del_upd
+ ON owner_meta (metadata_object_id, deleted_at, updated_at);
+```
+
+Backfill strategy for the newly added `updated_at` columns:
+
+1. DDL adds columns with default `0`.
+2. One-time backfill sets `updated_at = create_time` (or `last_modified_time`
if available)
+ for existing active rows.
+3. New write-path hooks become the long-term source of truth.
+
+Using explicit backfill avoids a long-lived "all zero" window that would force
unnecessary cold
+reloads at rollout time.
+
+---
+
+### 4.3 Eventual Consistency: Ownership Cache (`ownerRelCache`)
+
+#### Why `ownerRelCache` Is Critical for Performance
+
+Nearly all authorization expressions include `ANY(OWNER, METALAKE, CATALOG)` or
+`ANY(OWNER, METALAKE, CATALOG, SCHEMA, ...)`. These expand via OGNL to a chain
of
+`METALAKE::OWNER || CATALOG::OWNER || ...` calls. Each term calls `isOwner()`
**directly**,
+independent of the `authorize()` path. Every auth request triggers **2–4
`isOwner()` calls**
+(one per ancestor level). Without a cache, this adds 2–4 extra `owner_meta` DB
queries per
+request. For most non-owner users, the result is `Optional.empty()`, so the
cache primarily
+stores empty-ownership negatives that let the check fail quickly.
+
+#### Why Version-Validated Caching Is Unnecessary for Ownership
+
+| Cache | What a version check
returns | What it saves
|
+|--------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| `loadedRoles` | `(role_id, updated_at)`
| Skips reloading all securable objects + JCasbin `addPolicy` calls —
**expensive** |
+| `ownerRelCache` (hypothetical version-validated) | `(metadata_object_id,
owner_id)` | Nothing — the version check query **already returns `owner_id`**
|
+
+A version-validated `ownerRelCache` would add schema columns, write-path
version bumps, and
+per-request version queries — while saving exactly zero DB queries beyond what
the version
+check itself costs. Complexity without benefit.
+
+#### Invalidation Strategy: TTL Safety-Net + Write-Path Hook + Owner Change
Poller
+
+`ownerRelCache` uses a three-layer strategy:
+
+1. **Local node — immediate**: `handleMetadataOwnerChange()` hook fires after
the ownership
+ transfer transaction commits and calls
`ownerRelCache.invalidate(metadataId)`.
+2. **HA peer nodes — targeted, near real-time (≤ 1 s)**: the owner change
poller queries
+ `owner_meta WHERE updated_at > maxOwnerUpdatedAt`. For each returned row it
calls
+ `ownerRelCache.invalidate(metadataObjectId)` — only the changed entries are
evicted;
+ unrelated cached ownerships remain hot.
+3. **TTL — safety net only**: a long TTL (e.g. 1 hour) catches any missed
invalidation
+ (e.g. poller downtime). Correctness relies on hook + poller, not TTL.
+
+`owner_meta` is a 1:1 table (one row per entity with an owner). The poller can
read
+`updated_at` directly from the source table and immediately get the
`metadata_object_id` to
+invalidate — no intermediate log table is needed. This avoids write
amplification and keeps
+the design simple.
+
+#### Why Eventual Consistency Is Safe for Ownership
+
+Privilege revocation (GRANT/REVOKE) is handled by the **strong-consistency**
Steps 1 + 3.
+Ownership transfer is an administrative reorganisation, not an emergency
access revocation —
+a ≤ 1 s grace period on HA peer nodes is operationally acceptable and
consistent with how
+similar systems (AWS IAM, Apache Polaris) treat structural metadata changes.
+
+#### Schema Change
+
+```sql
+-- Ownership mutation tracking (eventual consistency — owner change poller)
+ALTER TABLE `owner_meta`
+ ADD COLUMN `updated_at` BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0
+ COMMENT 'Set to currentTimeMillis() on any ownership transfer.
+ The owner change poller reads updated_at > maxSeen to find
changed rows
+ and invalidates only the specific metadataObjectIds in
ownerRelCache.';
+```
+
+---
+
+### 4.4 Eventual Consistency: Name→ID Cache (`metadataIdCache`)
+
+#### The Problem: Repeated `getID()` Calls in OGNL Expression Evaluation
+
+`MetadataIdConverter.getID()` calls `entityStore.get()` for every unique
`(MetadataObject,
+privilege)` combination in the OGNL expression. The `allowAuthorizerCache`
deduplicates
+complete `(principal, metalake, obj, privilege)` results, but different
privileges on the same
+object (e.g. `METALAKE::USE_CATALOG`, `METALAKE::USE_SCHEMA`,
`METALAKE::DENY_USE_CATALOG`)
+each trigger a separate `getID(METALAKE)` call. A full
`LOAD_TABLE_AUTHORIZATION_EXPRESSION`
+evaluation can trigger **8–12 `getID()` calls**, of which most are for the
same 3–4 objects.
+
+#### Hierarchical Cache Key with Prefix-Based Cascade Invalidation
+
+The cache key uses a hierarchical `::` separator that enables prefix-based
cascade eviction:
+
+| Entity type | Key example | Is non-leaf? |
+|-------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|
+| METALAKE | `lake1::` | ✓ (trailing `::`) |
+| CATALOG | `lake1::cat1::` | ✓ |
+| SCHEMA | `lake1::cat1::s1::` | ✓ |
+| TABLE | `lake1::cat1::s1::t1::TABLE` | leaf |
+| FILESET | `lake1::cat1::s1::fs1::FILESET` | leaf |
+| TOPIC | `lake1::cat1::s1::tp1::TOPIC` | leaf |
+| MODEL | `lake1::cat1::s1::m1::MODEL` | leaf |
+| VIEW | `lake1::cat1::s1::v1::VIEW` | leaf |
+
+`invalidateByPrefix("lake1::cat1::")` evicts the catalog entry AND all
schemas, tables,
+filesets, and other entities beneath it in a single O(n) pass over the cache
(bounded, DDL is
+rare).
+
+#### Why `entity_change_log` Instead of Adding `updated_at` to Entity Tables
Review Comment:
Is this only track the "rename", or "create" and "deletion"?
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