jerryshao commented on code in PR #10696:
URL: https://github.com/apache/gravitino/pull/10696#discussion_r3078725417
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design-docs/cache-improvement-design.md:
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@@ -0,0 +1,873 @@
+# Gravitino Cache Improvement Design
+
+---
+
+## 1. Background
+
+### 1.1 System Overview
+
+Gravitino is a unified metadata management control plane. Compute engines
(Spark, Flink, Trino)
+call it during query planning to resolve catalog, schema, and table metadata,
and to verify
+user permissions. The access pattern is distinctly **read-heavy,
write-light**: DDL operations
+are infrequent, and metadata is resolved once per job.
+
+Gravitino is evolving from single-node to multi-node active-active HA
deployment. Each node
+currently maintains its own independent in-process Caffeine cache with no
cross-node
+synchronisation. Under HA, any write on one node leaves other nodes' caches
stale until TTL
+expiry.
+
+---
+
+### 1.2 Current Cache Architecture Overview
+
+Gravitino maintains three distinct caching layers for the authorization path:
+
+```
+┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│ Layer 3: Per-request cache (AuthorizationRequestContext) │
+│ Scope: one HTTP request; prevents duplicate auth calls │
+├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
+│ Layer 2: Auth policy caches (JcasbinAuthorizer) │
+│ loadedRoles Cache<Long, Boolean> hook update/TTL │
+│ ownerRel Cache<Long, Optional<Long>> hook update/TTL │
+├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
+│ Layer 1: Entity store cache (RelationalEntityStore) │
+│ CaffeineEntityCache — or NoOpsCache when disabled │
+│ Caches entity reads and relation queries for all modules │
+│ Controlled by Configs.CACHE_ENABLED │
+└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
+```
+
+**JCasbin is the core of the auth cache system.** It maintains an in-memory
policy table:
+
+```
+(roleId, objectType, metadataId, privilege) → ALLOW | DENY
+```
+
+The Layer 2 caches exist solely to manage JCasbin's policy loading lifecycle:
+
+| Cache | Role
|
+|-----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| `loadedRoles: Cache<Long, Boolean>` | Tracks which roles are already
loaded into JCasbin — prevents repeated [C2]+[C3] queries on every auth request
|
+| `ownerRel: Cache<Long, Optional<Long>>` | Caches owner lookups — **prevents
[D1] on every auth request** (2–4 `isOwner()` calls per request, see §1.3.2) |
+
+Without `loadedRoles`, every auth request would re-execute N DB queries to
reload all of a
+user's role policies into JCasbin. These two caches are the reason the auth
path is fast on
+the warm path. Layer 1 (entity cache) additionally accelerates the name→ID
resolution calls
+([A], [B], [C1]) that feed into JCasbin's enforce call.
+
+---
+
+#### 1.2.1 Problems with the Current Entity Cache
+
+**The entity cache (Layer 1) has accumulated significant complexity and is not
well-suited to
+serve as a general-purpose or auth-dedicated caching layer.**
+
+##### Mixed responsibilities make it hard to maintain
+
+`CaffeineEntityCache` uses a single `Cache<EntityCacheRelationKey,
List<Entity>>` to store
+three semantically different kinds of data:
+
+| Stored data | Key form |
Example relation types |
+|-------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
+| Direct entity | `(nameIdentifier, entityType, null)` |
any entity: catalog, schema, table, user, role, ... |
+| Relation result set | `(nameIdentifier, entityType, relType)` |
`ROLE_USER_REL`, `TAG_METADATA_OBJECT_REL`, ... |
+| Reverse index entries | `ReverseIndexCache` (separate radix tree) |
entity → list of cache keys that reference it |
+
+On top of this, a `cacheIndex` (radix tree) keeps a prefix-indexed view of all
keys to
+support cascading invalidation. The resulting invalidation logic
(`invalidateEntities`) is a
+BFS traversal that walks both the forward index and the reverse index, making
it difficult to
+reason about correctness and hard to extend safely.
+
+The five relation types currently tracked (`METADATA_OBJECT_ROLE_REL`,
`ROLE_USER_REL`,
+`ROLE_GROUP_REL`, `POLICY_METADATA_OBJECT_REL`, `TAG_METADATA_OBJECT_REL`) are
all
+auth-related, which reflects the original design intent: **the entity cache
was built
+primarily to serve the auth path.** Over time it accumulated relation types
and reverse-index
+logic without a clear ownership model, making it harder to maintain and evolve.
+
+##### Limited benefit for non-auth interfaces
+
+For general metadata API calls (list catalogs, list schemas, list tables), the
entity cache
+provides minimal benefit:
+
+| Operation | Goes through cache? | Notes
|
+|------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
+| `list(namespace, type)` | **No** | Bypasses cache
entirely; always hits DB |
+| `get(ident, type)` (single entity) | Yes | Cache helps on
repeated reads of the same entity |
+| `update(ident, type)` | Invalidate only | Invalidates
entry, write always goes to DB |
+| `listEntitiesByRelation(...)` | Yes | Only for the five
auth-centric relation types |
+
+In practice, the most common metadata browsing operations (`LIST` endpoints)
are not cached
+at the entity store level. The cache's real workload is the auth path, where
the same user
+entity, role assignments, and resource IDs are resolved on every single
authorization check.
+
+**Conclusion:** The entity cache is a de-facto auth cache dressed up as a
general-purpose
+cache. Its complexity is unjustified for the non-auth use case, and its
TTL-based consistency
+model is insufficient for the auth use case (see §1.8). A purpose-built auth
cache layer —
+separate from the entity store — is the cleaner path forward.
+
+---
+
+### 1.3 JCasbin Authorization — Deep Dive
+
+#### 1.3.1 Call Graph for a Single `authorize()` Check
+
+```
+JcasbinAuthorizer.authorize(principal, metalake, metadataObject, privilege)
+│
+├─ [A] getUserEntity(username, metalake)
+│ entityStore.get(USER by NameIdentifier)
+│ → Needed to obtain integer userId for JCasbin enforce()
+│
+├─ [B] MetadataIdConverter.getID(metadataObject, metalake) ← TARGET
RESOURCE
+│ entityStore.get(entity by NameIdentifier)
+│ → Needed to get integer metadataId for JCasbin enforce()
+│ → Called on every auth request
+│
+├─ [C] loadRolePrivilege(metalake, username, userId, requestContext)
+│ │ (guarded by requestContext.hasLoadRole — runs once per HTTP request)
+│ │
+│ ├─ [C1] entityStore.listEntitiesByRelation(ROLE_USER_REL, userIdentifier)
+│ │ → Get all roles assigned to this user
+│ │
+│ └─ For each role NOT already in loadedRoles cache:
+│ ├─ [C2] entityStore.get(RoleEntity by name) ← async, thread pool
+│ └─ loadPolicyByRoleEntity(roleEntity)
+│ └─ For each securableObject in role.securableObjects():
+│ ├─ [C3] MetadataIdConverter.getID(securableObject, metalake)
+│ └─ enforcer.addPolicy(roleId, objType, metadataId, privilege,
effect)
+│
+│ loadedRoles.put(roleId, true) ← mark role as loaded
+│
+├─ [D] isOwner() / loadOwnerPolicy(...) ← called on EVERY auth request (not
only OWNER
+│ │ privilege checks). Nearly all auth expressions contain ANY(OWNER,
METALAKE, CATALOG),
+│ │ which expands to METALAKE::OWNER || CATALOG::OWNER || … and calls
isOwner() directly
+│ │ via OGNL, independently of the authorize() path. Typical call count:
2–4 per request.
+│ ├─ Check ownerRel cache → if HIT, return (most non-owner users get
Optional.empty())
+│ └─ [D1] entityStore.listEntitiesByRelation(OWNER_REL, ...)
+│ ownerRel.put(metadataId, Optional.of(ownerId))
+│
+└─ [E] enforcer.enforce(userId, objectType, metadataId, privilege) ←
in-memory, O(1)
+```
+
+#### 1.3.2 What Each Cache Protects
+
+`loadedRoles: Cache<Long, Boolean>` — answers "is this role's policy already
in JCasbin?"
+Without it, every request re-executes [C2]+[C3] for all roles the user has
(N+1 queries).
+With it, [C2]+[C3] only run on first load per role. **This is the most
critical cache.**
+
+`ownerRel: Cache<Long, Optional<Long>>` — caches ownership lookups for
OWNER-privilege
+checks. **Contrary to initial analysis, `ownerRel` is consulted on virtually
every auth
+request**, not only when `privilege == OWNER`. The reason is that nearly every
authorization
+expression in `AuthorizationExpressionConstants` includes `ANY(OWNER,
METALAKE, CATALOG)`
+or similar clauses (e.g. `LOAD_TABLE_AUTHORIZATION_EXPRESSION`,
+`FILTER_TABLE_AUTHORIZATION_EXPRESSION`,
`LOAD_CATALOG_AUTHORIZATION_EXPRESSION`). The
+`ANY(OWNER, …)` macro expands to `METALAKE::OWNER || CATALOG::OWNER || …`, and
each
+`X::OWNER` term calls `isOwner()` directly — a code path that is **independent
of
+`authorize()`**. As a result, every auth request triggers 2–4 `isOwner()`
calls (one per
+ancestor level), each consulting `ownerRel`. For most non-owner users,
`ownerRel` caches
+`Optional.empty()`, which lets the ownership sub-check fail quickly without a
DB query.
+Without `ownerRel`, every auth request would add 2–4 extra DB queries against
`owner_meta`.
+
+**What these caches do NOT protect** (hit DB on every auth request without
entity cache):
+
+| Call | Description
| Protected by |
+|----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------|
+| [A] `getUserEntity()` | Fetch User entity → get
integer userId | Entity cache only |
+| [B] `MetadataIdConverter.getID()` target | Resolve target resource name
→ integer ID | Entity cache only |
+| [C1] `listEntitiesByRelation(ROLE_USER_REL)` | Get user's role list
| Entity cache only |
+
+---
+
+### 1.4 Impact of Disabling Entity Cache
+
+Layer 2 sits **on top of** Layer 1. When Layer 1 is disabled (NoOpsCache),
calls [A], [B],
+[C1] hit DB on every auth request.
+
+| Call | With entity cache
| Without entity cache |
+|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|
+| [A] `getUserEntity()` | Cache hit after first
request | **DB query every auth request** |
+| [B] `MetadataIdConverter.getID()` target | Cache hit after first
request | **DB query every auth request** |
+| [C1] `listEntitiesByRelation(ROLE_USER_REL)` | Cache hit after first
request | **DB query every auth request** |
+| [C2] `entityStore.get(RoleEntity)` | Protected by
`loadedRoles` | DB only on cold role load |
+| [C3] `MetadataIdConverter.getID()` per privilege | Protected by
`loadedRoles` | DB only on cold role load |
+| [D1] `listEntitiesByRelation(OWNER_REL)` | Protected by `ownerRel`
| **DB query 2–4x per request** |
+
+---
+
+
+## 2. Goals
+
+### 2.1 The Two Problems to Solve
+
+**Problem 1 — Performance:** With entity cache disabled, [A] and [C1] hit DB
on every auth
+request. The new auth cache layer must protect these without relying on entity
store cache.
+([B] also hits DB, but this is correct and acceptable — see §1.5.)
+
+**Problem 2 — Consistency:** `loadedRoles` is TTL-bounded (1 hour staleness)
and updated by hook with in a instance. Permission
+changes must take effect at the next auth request, not after TTL expiry.
+
+Both problems are solved by the same mechanism: a version-validated cache for
the user's role
+list (userId comes for free from the same query).
+
+### 2.2 Requirements
+
+| Goal | Requirement
|
+|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| HA auth consistency | Privilege revocations visible on all nodes
at the next auth request |
+| Auth self-sufficiency | [A] and [C1] protected without relying on
entity store cache |
+| Auth performance | Hot path: ≤ 3 lightweight DB queries
|
+| No new mandatory infrastructure | Solution requires only the existing DB
|
+| Incremental delivery | Phase 1 independently shippable
|
+
+---
+
+## 3. Industry Reference
+
+### 3.1 Apache Polaris — Per-Entity Version Tracking
+
+#### Schema
+
+All entity types (catalogs, namespaces, tables, roles, principals) share a
single `ENTITIES`
+table (single-table inheritance). The two version columns are the key fields
for caching:
+
+```sql
+ENTITIES (
+ id BIGINT, -- Unique entity ID
+ catalog_id BIGINT, -- Owning catalog (0 for top-level entities)
+ parent_id BIGINT, -- Parent entity ID, forms the hierarchy
tree
+ type_code INT, -- Entity type enum (see hierarchy below)
+ name VARCHAR,
+ entity_version INT, -- Bumped on rename / property update /
drop ← key
+ sub_type_code INT, -- Subtype (ICEBERG_TABLE, ICEBERG_VIEW,
etc.)
+ properties JSON, -- User-visible properties (location,
format, etc.)
+ internal_properties JSON, -- Internal properties (credentials,
storage config, etc.)
+ grant_records_version INT, -- Bumped on every GRANT or REVOKE
← key
+)
+
+GRANT_RECORDS (
+ securable_catalog_id BIGINT,
+ securable_id BIGINT, -- The resource being secured
(table/namespace/catalog)
+ grantee_catalog_id BIGINT,
+ grantee_id BIGINT, -- The principal or role receiving the grant
+ privilege_code INT -- One of 102 defined privileges
+)
+```
+
+`GRANT_RECORDS` has no version column of its own. The version fingerprint is
stored in
+`ENTITIES.grant_records_version` — detecting staleness requires no scan of
`GRANT_RECORDS`.
+
+#### Entity Type Hierarchy
+
+```
+ROOT
+ ├── PRINCIPAL (user account, isGrantee)
+ ├── PRINCIPAL_ROLE (user-level role, isGrantee)
+ └── CATALOG
+ ├── CATALOG_ROLE (catalog-level role, isGrantee)
+ ├── NAMESPACE
+ │ └── TABLE_LIKE / POLICY / FILE
+ └── TASK
+```
+
+Only `PRINCIPAL`, `PRINCIPAL_ROLE`, and `CATALOG_ROLE` are **grantees** (can
receive grants).
+All others are **securables** (privileges are set on them).
+
+#### How `grantRecordsVersion` Is Maintained
+
+Every `grantPrivilege` / `revokePrivilege` call performs three writes in **one
DB transaction**:
+
+1. Insert or delete the `GRANT_RECORDS` row.
+2. Increment `grant_records_version` on the **grantee** entity row.
+3. Increment `grant_records_version` on the **securable** entity row.
+
+Both sides are bumped atomically — no separate changelog table is needed.
+
+#### Version-Validated Cache
+
+The cache unit is `ResolvedPolarisEntity` = entity metadata + grant records in
both directions.
+On every request, `bulkValidate()` issues one batch query for all path
entities:
+
+```sql
+SELECT * FROM ENTITIES WHERE (catalog_id, id) IN ((?, ?), ...)
+```
+
+| Path | Condition | Action
|
+|-------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------------|
+| Cache hit | Both versions current | Serve from cache — **0
extra queries** |
+| Stale, targeted refresh | Either version behind | Reload only the changed
dimension |
+| Cache miss | Not in cache | Full load
|
+
+The DB is the single source of truth; no broadcast is needed for correctness.
+
+**Key difference from Gravitino:** Polaris bundles entity + grants in one
cached object, so one
+batch query covers both dimensions. Gravitino separates user→role from
role→privilege, requiring
+2 version-check queries on a warm hit (see §4.1 Step 1 and Step 3). Both
achieve strong
+consistency.
+
+### 3.2 Other References
+
+**Nessie** — HTTP fan-out invalidation: async POST to peer nodes on write,
convergence < 200 ms.
+
+**Keycloak** — JGroups embedded cluster messaging: in-JVM broadcast, no
separate service.
+Recommended future direction if Gravitino needs stronger delivery guarantees.
+
+**DB version polling** — monotonic counters incremented in write transaction;
a background
+thread polls for version changes and proactively invalidates caches.
Considered but not
+adopted; per-request validation (§4.1) achieves strong consistency without
background threads.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Design
+
+### 4.1 Per-Request Version Check (Polaris Style)
+
+Every auth request executes two lightweight version-check queries before
serving from cache.
+If any version has advanced, only the stale portion is reloaded. Staleness
window: **zero**.
+
+#### 4.1.1 Schema Changes
+
+Three new version columns, all `DEFAULT 1` — fully backward compatible.
Existing rows get
+version 1; first auth check after migration populates caches normally.
+
+```sql
+ALTER TABLE `role_meta`
+ ADD COLUMN `securable_objects_version` INT UNSIGNED NOT NULL DEFAULT 1
+ COMMENT 'Incremented atomically with any privilege grant/revoke for this
role';
+
+ALTER TABLE `user_meta`
+ ADD COLUMN `role_grants_version` INT UNSIGNED NOT NULL DEFAULT 1
+ COMMENT 'Incremented atomically with any role assignment/revocation for
this user';
+
+ALTER TABLE `group_meta`
+ ADD COLUMN `role_grants_version` INT UNSIGNED NOT NULL DEFAULT 1
+ COMMENT 'Incremented atomically with any role assignment/revocation for
this group';
+```
+
+Write paths that must bump the version **in the same DB transaction**:
+
+| Operation | Column
| Location |
+|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|
+| Grant / revoke privilege on role R | `role_meta.securable_objects_version
WHERE role_id = R` | `RoleMetaService` |
+| Assign / revoke role for user U | `user_meta.role_grants_version WHERE
user_id = U` | `UserMetaService` |
+| Assign / revoke role for group G | `group_meta.role_grants_version WHERE
group_id = G` | `GroupMetaService` |
+
+Version comparison uses `!=` (not `<`) to safely handle theoretical INT
wrap-around.
+
+**Ownership transfers** require no schema change and no cache. The `ownerRel`
cache is
+**removed** (see §7.2). Step 2.5 queries `owner_meta` directly with a single
batch query on
+every auth request — strongly consistent, no versioning complexity needed.
+
+#### 4.1.2 Cache Data Structures (Changes in JcasbinAuthorizer)
+
+```java
+// ─── BEFORE ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+private Cache<Long, Boolean> loadedRoles; // roleId → loaded?
+private Cache<Long, Optional<Long>> ownerRel;
+
+// ─── AFTER ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+// NEW: replaces entity cache dependency for [A] (userId) and [C1] (role list).
+// Step 1 query returns both user_id and role_grants_version in one shot.
+// metalakeName→metalakeId resolved inline via JOIN — no dedicated cache
needed.
+private GravitinoCache<String, CachedUserRoles> userRoleCache;
+// key = metalakeName + ":" + userName
+
+record CachedUserRoles(
+ long userId, // integer userId for JCasbin enforce()
+ int roleGrantsVersion, // user_meta.role_grants_version at load time
+ List<Long> roleIds // role ID list at load time
+) {}
+
+// NEW: mirrors userRoleCache for groups (group can also hold role
assignments).
+private GravitinoCache<String, CachedGroupRoles> groupRoleCache;
+// key = metalakeName + ":" + groupName
+
+record CachedGroupRoles(
+ long groupId,
+ int roleGrantsVersion, // group_meta.role_grants_version at load
time
+ List<Long> roleIds
+) {}
+
+// TYPE CHANGE: was Cache<Long, Boolean>, now stores securable_objects_version.
+// Enables version-based staleness detection rather than TTL expiry.
+private GravitinoCache<Long, Integer> loadedRoles;
+// roleId → securable_objects_version at the time JCasbin policies were loaded
+
+// REMOVED: ownerRel cache eliminated (see §7.2).
+// isOwner() is called 2–4 times per request, but version-validated caching
offers no
+// query savings: the version check query already returns the owner_id, so
there is nothing
+// expensive to avoid. Step 2.5 queries owner_meta directly via one batch
query per request.
+// private Cache<Long, Optional<Long>> ownerRel;
+```
+
+**Why no cache for [B] (target resource name→ID):**
+Adding a `metadataIdCache` would require invalidation on every entity rename,
drop, or
+recreate across all entity types. Since JCasbin uses integer IDs (not names),
the DB lookup
+for [B] is always correct (~1 ms indexed). Simpler and more correct to hit DB
every request.
+
+**Why `ownerRel` is removed:**
+`isOwner()` is called 2–4 times per auth request (once per ancestor in the
OGNL expression
+chain). A version-validated cache would still query `owner_meta` on every
request to check
+versions — and that same query already returns the `owner_id`. There is no
expensive
+downstream work to avoid (unlike roles, where skipping securable-object
loading saves
+significant work). Caching adds complexity with zero query savings. Step 2.5
issues one
+batch query per request directly against `owner_meta`, achieving strong
consistency with
+no extra infrastructure. See §7.2.
+
+#### 4.1.3 Auth Check Flow
+
+```
+authorize(metalakeName, username, resource, operation)
+│
+├─ STEP 1 — User + Group version check (2 queries, metalake resolved via JOIN):
+│
+│ [1a] User query:
+│ SELECT um.user_id, um.role_grants_version
+│ FROM user_meta um
+│ JOIN metalake_meta mm ON um.metalake_id = mm.metalake_id AND mm.deleted_at
= 0
+│ WHERE mm.metalake_name = ? AND um.user_name = ? AND um.deleted_at = 0
+│
+│ userRoleCache HIT and role_grants_version matches:
+│ → use cached userId and roleIds [A] and [C1] avoided
+│ MISS or version mismatch:
+│ → SELECT role_id FROM user_role_rel WHERE user_id = ? AND deleted_at = 0
+│ → re-associate userId ↔ roleIds in JCasbin allow/deny enforcers
+│ → userRoleCache.put(key, CachedUserRoles(userId, version, roleIds))
+│
+│ [1b] Group query (user may belong to groups that also hold roles):
+│ SELECT gm.group_id, gm.role_grants_version
+│ FROM group_meta gm
+│ JOIN group_user_rel gu ON gm.group_id = gu.group_id AND gu.deleted_at = 0
+│ WHERE gu.user_id = ? AND gm.deleted_at = 0
+│
+│ For each group:
+│ groupRoleCache HIT and role_grants_version matches:
+│ → use cached groupId and roleIds [group C1] avoided
+│ MISS or version mismatch:
+│ → SELECT role_id FROM group_role_rel WHERE group_id = ? AND deleted_at
= 0
+│ → addRoleForUser(userId, roleId) in JCasbin enforcers
+│ → groupRoleCache.put(groupKey, CachedGroupRoles(groupId, version,
roleIds))
Review Comment:
You need to confirm with @roryqi about the current group implementation.
AFAIK, we don't have user-group mapping stored in Gravitino. So `group` is
another special `user`.
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