On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 1:31 AM, Victor Khimenko <[email protected]> wrote: > Consider this attack vector: URL file on Desktop. Chrome will be started > from known directory, now we need to put malicious file there. Hmm. Easy: > create archive with some valuable data AND file http:/www.google.com (as > we've dicussed it's valid filename on Linux and MacOS). A lot of users will > just unpack it on desktop and ignore some strange folder named "http". Then > they click on URL file and the data from computer is sent to some unknown > direction.
I'm not really sure where you're going, here. Why would this be any different than convincing the user to click on a .html file? Chrome's various protections are based on where Chrome is getting the file from, not on the shape of the URL (if you open a file named "https://citibank.com";, that file will NOT get the citibank.com secure cookie, etc). -scott
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