LGTM3 to add a warning.

Normally we don't like open ended deprecation warnings, end, which this is, but this should be a rare warning, except possibly in enterprise situations, and even there, warnings might trigger some feedback from a group that is normally not aware of upcoming changes.

/Daniel

On 2024-02-07 14:40, Yoav Weiss (@Shopify) wrote:
LGTM2

On Fri, Feb 2, 2024 at 11:10 PM Mike Taylor <[email protected]> wrote:

    Correction: LGTM1, conditioned on requesting Enterprise,
    Debuggability, and Testing bits in chromestatus. :)

    On 2/2/24 5:09 PM, Mike Taylor wrote:

    LGTM1

    On 2/2/24 11:17 AM, Jonathan Hao wrote:


            Contact emails

    [email protected]


            Explainer

    https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/blob/main/explainer.md


            Specification

    https://wicg.github.io/private-network-access


            Design docs


    
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1UqkJsc2VZ4bXmZkVxh-EPyBFEtdxX9p2zX4sxzAj754/edit?usp=sharing&resourcekey=0-7cfhrTo57AElxA6M9EVScg
    
<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1UqkJsc2VZ4bXmZkVxh-EPyBFEtdxX9p2zX4sxzAj754/edit?usp=sharing&resourcekey=0-7cfhrTo57AElxA6M9EVScg>


            Summary

    Before a website A navigates to another site B in the user's
    private network, this feature does the following:
    1. Checks whether the request has been initiated from a secure
    context
    2. Sends a preflight request, and checks whether B responds with
    a header that allows private network access.

    The above checks are made to protect the user's private network.
    There are already features for subresources and workers, but
    this one is for navigation requests specifically.


    Since this feature is the "warning-only" mode, we do not fail
    the requests if any of the checks fails.  Instead, a warning
    will be shown in the DevTools, to help developers prepare for
    the coming enforcement.



            Blink component

    Blink>SecurityFeature>CORS>PrivateNetworkAccess
    
<https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Blink%3ESecurityFeature%3ECORS%3EPrivateNetworkAccess>


            Motivation

    To prevent malicious websites from pivoting through the user
    agent's network position to attack devices and services which
    reasonably assumed they were unreachable from the Internet at
    large, by virtue of residing on the user’s local intranet or the
    user's machine.



            Initial public proposal

    
https://discourse.wicg.io/t/transfer-cors-rfc1918-and-hsts-priming-to-wicg/1726


            TAG review

    https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/572


            TAG review status

    Issues addressed


            Risks



            Interoperability and Compatibility

    Since we don't enforce the checks and only show warnings, there
    isn't any compatibility risks on the client side. On the server
    side, it shouldn't pose any risk either as the server can ignore
    the preflight requests.



    /Gecko/: Positive
    (https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/143)
    https://mozilla.github.io/standards-positions/#cors-and-rfc1918
    makes it a bit clearer that this is indeed positive (vs the issue).

    /WebKit/: Positive
    (https://github.com/WebKit/standards-positions/issues/163)
    Safari disagrees with the spec name and header names, but still
    overall positive.

    /Web developers/: Mixed signals Anecdotal evidence so far
    suggests that most web developers are OK with this new
    requirement, though some do not control the target endpoints and
    would be negatively impacted.

    /Other signals/:


            Security

    This change aims to be security-positive, preventing CSRF
    attacks against soft and juicy targets such as router admin
    interfaces. DNS rebinding threats were of particular concern
    during the design of this feature:
    
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1FYPIeP90MQ_pQ6UAo0mCB3g2Z_AynfPWHbDnHIST6VI/edit#heading=h.189j5gnadts9



            WebView application risks

    Does this intent deprecate or change behavior of existing APIs,
    such that it has potentially high risk for Android WebView-based
    applications?

    None



            Debuggability

    Relevant information (client and resource IP address space) is
    already piped into the DevTools network panel. Deprecation
    warnings and errors will be surfaced in the DevTools issues
    panel explaining the problem when it arises.



            Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests
            
<https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md>?

    Yes

    
https://wpt.fyi/results/fetch/private-network-access?q=fetch%2Fprivate-network-access&run_id=5090117631868928&run_id=6245938696814592&run_id=5769215446351872&run_id=5679819023974400
    
<https://wpt.fyi/results/fetch/private-network-access?q=fetch%2Fprivate-network-access&run_id=5090117631868928&run_id=6245938696814592&run_id=5769215446351872&run_id=5679819023974400>



            Flag name on chrome://flags

    None


            Finch feature name

    PrivateNetworkAccessForNavigations,
    PrivateNetworkAccessForNavigationsWarningOnly


            Requires code in //chrome?

    False


            Tracking bug

    https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1524350


            Estimated milestones

    Shipping on desktop         124

    Shipping on Android         124



            Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status

    https://chromestatus.com/feature/4869685172764672

    This intent message was generated by Chrome Platform Status
    <https://chromestatus.com/>.
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