On 12 Feb 2006 at 13:49, Landon Fuller wrote:

> Dan Langille wrote:
> > On 5 Feb 2006 at 18:33, Landon Fuller wrote:
> > 
> > 
> >>In the spirit of status reports -- Bacula's File Daemon now has complete 
> >>support for signing and encryption data prior to sending it to the 
> >>Storage Daemon, and decrypting said data upon receipt from the Storage 
> >>Daemon.
> > 
> > 
> > Now that's pretty cool!
> 
> Thanks!
> 
> > How does it work?  Just simple public key encryption type thing?
> 
> Right - a session key is randomly generated for each backup job, and 
> that session key is then encrypted using "recipients'" public keys. By 
> specifying multiple public keys, one can specify multiple recipients 
> that may decrypt the backup.

Multiple decryption keys is a nice feature.

> The downside to the current implementation is that a copy of the 
> encrypted session keys is saved with *every file*. The size of this data 
> structure isn't huge, but it does add up. If I recall correctly, with a 
> single 2048 bit key the on disk structure was ~280 bytes. For 100,000 
> files, that adds up to 26 megabytes.

100,000 files is a big backup anyway.  So another 26MB isn't much.  
I'm backing up to DLT 7000...  26MB is less than 1% of a tape.

> I'm not sure how much of an issue this is for potential users of FD-side 
> data encryption. The upside is that the backups are much more resilient 
> to tape/disk corruption.

I think it's pretty minimal.  The first time they get a bad spot on a 
tape, they'll be glad to have it.

> As far as generating the keys, I'm just using self-signed PEM encoded 
> x509 certificates and private keys. They be generated with a couple 
> openssl(1) one-liners.
> 
> One other issue worth raising -- The director can currently overwrite 
> any file on the FD, including the encryption keys or the FD 
> configuration file, thus exposing private data to the director.

Overwriting is not something I'd thought of.  Perhaps it's time to 
come up with some FD-side restrictions:

Protected {
        NoAccess = /path/to/my/keys
}

This is a directory level directive.  The FD will neither read nor 
write anything under that directory.  This cannot be overridden by 
the Director.

> I thought that we could solve this by either:
>     1) Provide a "Allow Restore" flag that allows one to disable 
> restoration until it's actually needed, or
>     2) Provide a "Restore Root" directive that allows the specification 
> of a restoration root under which all restored files must live. I prefer 
> this option, but 1) is certainly easier.

I like #1.  It allows a user to have confidence that files cannot be 
updated without their knowledge.  #2 means that the FD specifies the 
"Where" parameter that we see in the restore command.  The DIR would 
not be able to override this parameter.

> > I've been using the TLS feature for a few weeks now.  I'm pretty 
> > happy with it.  It's been working every time withojut fail.   No more 
> > stunnel for me.
> 
> Glad to hear it. We've been using the TLS implementation ever since the 
>   tail-end of the 1.37 release cycle, zero problems. One feature I'd 
> really like to see is the implementation of SSH-style public key 
> validation -- caching the public key on first connect and then 
> validating against the cache. It'd be a nice alternative to maintaining 
> x509 infrastructure. I don't know when I'll have time to tackle the 
> problem, but if anyone is interested in the project I'd be happy to 
> provide some pointers. It's not too hard to do ...

SSH keys would be a nice option, I agree.  Many people are familiar 
with SSH keys and it's one less thing for them to learn.


-- 
Dan Langille : Software Developer looking for work
my resume: http://www.freebsddiary.org/dan_langille.php




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