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We will wait to hear from you before continuing with the publication process. The AUTH48 status page for this document is located here: https://www.rfc-editor.org/auth48/rfc9955 Thank you, Alanna Paloma RFC Production Center > On Apr 3, 2026, at 9:53 AM, [email protected] wrote: > > Authors, > > While reviewing this document during AUTH48, please resolve (as necessary) > the following questions, which are also in the source file. > > > 1) <!--[rfced] Note that we have updated the short title, which appears in > the running header > In the PDF output, as follows. > > Original: > ietf-pquip-hybrid-spectrums > > Current: > Hybrid Signature Spectrums > --> > > > 2) <!-- [rfced] Please insert any keywords (beyond those that appear in > the title) for use on https://www.rfc-editor.org/search. --> > > > 3) <!--[rfced] We note that both of the following terms are used in the > document > (note "Project" vs. "Process"). Should these be made consistent? > > NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Project > NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process > > Original: > Research has indicated > that implementation-independent attacks published in 2023 or earlier > had broken 48% of the proposals in Round 1 of the NIST Post-Quantum > Cryptography Standardization Project, 25% of the proposals not broken > in Round 1, and 36% of the proposals selected by NIST for Round 2 > [QRCSP]. > ... > Of note, some next-generation algorithms have received considerable > analysis, for example, following attention gathered during the NIST > Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process [NIST_PQC_FAQ]. > --> > > > 4) <!--[rfced] FYI - We updated "25% of the proposals not broken in Round 1" > as > follows for clarity. > > Original: > Research has indicated > that implementation-independent attacks published in 2023 or earlier > had broken 48% of the proposals in Round 1 of the NIST Post-Quantum > Cryptography Standardization Project, 25% of the proposals not broken > in Round 1, and 36% of the proposals selected by NIST for Round 2 > [QRCSP]. > > Perhaps: > Research indicates > that implementation-independent attacks published in 2023 or earlier had > broken 48% of the proposals in Round 1 of the NIST Post-Quantum > Cryptography Standardization Project, 25% of the proposals not broken by > the end of Round 1, and 36% of the proposals selected by NIST for Round 2 > [QRCSP]. > --> > > > 5) <!-- [rfced] We were unable to find the quoted text below in [RFC9794]. > Is this quote from [RFC9794] or another reference? > > Original: > This is different from [RFC9794] where the term > is used as a specific instantiation of hybrid schemes such that > "where multiple cryptographic algorithms are combined to form a > single key or signature such that they can be treated as a single > atomic object at the protocol level." > --> > > > 6) <!--[rfced] To improve readability, may we break up this long sentence > into two sentences and update as follows? > > Original: > While it often makes sense for security purposes to require that > the security of the component schemes is based on the hardness of > different cryptographic assumptions, in other cases hybrid schemes > might be motivated, e.g., by interoperability of variants on the > same scheme and as such both component schemes are based on the > same hardness assumption (e.g., both post-quantum assumptions or > even both the same concrete assumption such as Ring LWE). > > Perhaps: > For security purposes, it often makes sense to require that > the security of the component schemes be based on the hardness of > different cryptographic assumptions, but in some cases, hybrid schemes > might be motivated, e.g., by interoperability of variants on the > same scheme. As such, both component schemes are based on the > same hardness assumption (e.g., both post-quantum assumptions or > even both the same concrete assumption, such as Ring Learning With Errors > (LWE)). > --> > > > 7) <!-- [rfced] Is "CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM" another name for "ML-DSA"? Or are they > separate schemes? Please review and let us know if/how this text may be > clarified. > > Current: > For example, the > signature scheme Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm > (ML-DSA) [MLDSA] (also known as CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM) follows the well- > known Fiat-Shamir transform [FS] to construct the signature scheme > but also relies on rejection sampling that is known to give cache > side channel information (although this does not lead to a known > attack). > > Section 1.2 of [MLDSA] (FIPS 204) states the following about ML-DSA > and CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM: > ML-DSA is derived from one of the selected schemes, CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM > [5 , 6 ], and is intended to protect sensitive U.S. Government > information well into the foreseeable future, including after the > advent of cryptographically relevant quantum computers. For the > differences between ML-DSA and CRYSTALS- DILITHIUM, see Appendix D. > --> > > > 8) <!-- [rfced] The second sentence below seems to be saying the same thing as > the first. Should the second sentence be removed? > > Current: > Hybrid unforgeability is a specific type of hybrid authentication, > where the security assumption for the scheme (e.g., EUF-CMA) is > maintained as long as at least one of the component schemes maintains > that security assumption. We call this notion 'hybrid > unforgeability'; it is a specific type of hybrid authentication. > > Perhaps: > Hybrid unforgeability is a specific type of hybrid authentication, > where the security assumption for the scheme (e.g., EUF-CMA) is > maintained as long as at least one of the component schemes maintains > that security assumption. > --> > > > 9) <!-- [rfced] For the ease of the reader, may we update "description below" > and > "discussion below" to a section number? If so, please confirm that > Section 1.3.5 is correct. > > Original: > There might be, however, other goals in competition with this one, > such as backward-compatibility - referring to the property where a > hybrid signature may be verified by only verifying one component > signature (see description below). > ... > For more details, we refer to our discussion below. > > Perhaps: > There might be, however, other goals in competition with this one, > such as backward compatibility - referring to the property where a > hybrid signature may be verified by only verifying one component > signature (see Section 1.3.5). > ... > For more details, refer to Section 1.3.5. > --> > > > 10) <!-- [rfced] We are having trouble understanding the first part of this > sentence. Would revising as shown below improve clarity while retaining > the intended meaning? > > Original: > Use cases where a hybrid scheme is used with, e.g., EUF-CMA security > assumed for only one component scheme generally use hybrid techniques > for their 'functional transition' pathway support. > ... > In contrast, use cases where a hybrid scheme is used with e.g., EUF- > CMA security assumed for both component schemes without > prioritisation between them can use hybrid techniques for both > functional transition and security transition ... > > Perhaps: > In some use cases, a hybrid scheme is used with (for example) EUF-CMA > security > assumed for only one component scheme; these cases generally use hybrid > techniques > for their 'functional transition' pathway support. > ... > In contrast, in other use cases, a hybrid scheme is used with (for example) > EUF- > CMA security assumed for both component schemes without > prioritisation between them; these cases can use hybrid techniques for both > functional transition and security transition ... > --> > > > 11) <!-- [rfced] How may we update "algorithms/the" here? > > Original: > For instance, this can intuitively be seen in > cases of a message containing a context note on hybrid > authentication, that is then signed by all component algorithms/the > hybrid signature scheme. > > Perhaps: > For instance, this can intuitively be seen in > cases of a message containing a context note on hybrid > authentication, that is then signed by all component algorithms in the > hybrid signature scheme. > --> > > > 12) <!-- [rfced] Should 'component digital signatures "categories"' be > updated to > use singular 'signature' as shown in Perhaps A, recast as shown in > Perhaps B, or revised in some other way? > > Original: > Hybrid generality means that a general signature combiner is defined, > based on inherent and common structures of component digital > signatures "categories." > > Perhaps A: > Hybrid generality means that a general signature combiner is defined > based on inherent and common structures of component digital > signature "categories". > > Perhaps B: > Hybrid generality means that a general signature combiner is defined > based on inherent and common structures of "categories" of the component > digital > signatures. > --> > > > 13) <!-- [rfced] We could not find any mention of "space" in > draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design (RFC-to-be 9954). Please review and let us > know how this citation may be updated. > > Original: > Similarly to space considerations in [I-D.ietf-tls-hybrid-design], > hybrid signature constructions are expected to be as space performant > as possible. > --> > > > 14) <!-- [rfced] We made a few changes to Figures 1 and 2 (e.g., updated > spacing, added articles, and included punctuation). Please review. > --> > > > 15) <!-- [rfced] Will readers understand what is meant by "hybrid" and > "hybrids" > (noun) in these sentences? Should these be updated to "hybrid signature" > and "hybrid signatures" (or to something else), or is the current clear? > > Original: > Under Weak > Non-Separability, if one of the component signatures of a hybrid is > removed artifacts of the hybrid will remain (in the message, > signature, or at the protocol level, etc.). > ... > Note that in this latter case, it is not > possible for an adversary to strip one of the component signatures or > use a component of the hybrid to create a forgery for a component > algorithm. > ... > applies equally to any guidance or > policy direction that specifies that at least one component algorithm > of the hybrid has passed some certification type while not specifying > requirements on the other component. > ... > however, we use it as motivation to highlight some points > that implementers of hybrids may wish to consider when following any > guidance documents that specify ... > ... > This type of need for approval (i.e., a requirement that an > implementer is looking to follow regarding approval or certification > of the software module implementation of a hybrid or its component > algorithms) can drive some logistical decisions on what types of > hybrids an implementer should consider. > ... > If the hybrid signature is > stripped, such that a single component signature is submitted to a > verification algorithm for that component along with the message that > was signed by the hybrid, the result would be an EUF-CMA forgery for > the component signature. > ... > Thus, if EUF-CMA security for hybrids is considered to be informally > defined in the straightforward way as ... > --> > > > 16) <!-- [rfced] How may we clarify "message/inner" here? > > Original: > In another example, under nested signatures the verifier > could be tricked into interpreting a new message as the message/inner > signature combination and verify only the outer signature. > > Perhaps A: > In another example, under nested signatures, the verifier > could be tricked into interpreting a new message as the message and inner > signature combination and verify only the outer signature. > > Perhaps B: > In another example, under nested signatures, the verifier > could be tricked into interpreting a new message as the combination of the > message and inner signature and verify only the outer signature. > --> > > > 17) <!--[rfced] To improve readability, may we update the second sentence > below as > follows? The first sentence is included for context. > > Original: > The verifier could indeed ignore the artifact, hence the scheme achieving > only weak non-separability and not strong non-separability. It is > rather that an artifact exists that could be identified if an > investigation occurred, etc. > > Perhaps: > The verifier could indeed ignore the artifact, resulting in the scheme > achieving only weak non-separability and not strong non-separability. > However, > an existing artifact could be identified if an investigation occurred. > --> > > > 18) <!-- [rfced] Will "As can be seen" be clear to readers in these two > sentences? > Could it be updated to "As shown in Table 1" in the first sentence and > removed in the second sentence? > > Original: > As can be seen, while concatenation may appear to refer to a single > type of combiner, there are in fact several possible artifact > locations depending on implementation choices. > ... > However, as can be seen, this does not imply that > every implementation using concatenation fails to achieve non- > separability. > > Perhaps: > As shown in Table 1, while concatenation may appear to refer to a single > type of combiner, there are in fact several possible artifact > locations depending on implementation choices. > ... > However, this does not imply that > every implementation using concatenation fails to achieve non- > separability. > --> > > > 19) <!-- [rfced] The quoted text below no longer appears at the URL provided > for > [NIST_PQC_FAQ]: https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/faqs. > That page was lasted updated on 19 November 2025. > > We found an archived URL from the Internet Archive from 5 July 2022 > (the original date used for this reference): > https://web.archive.org/web/20220705163944/https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/ > post-quantum-cryptography/faqs > > May we update this reference to use the archived URL? > > Original: > Assume that in a [hybrid] signature, _one signature is generated > with a NIST-approved signature scheme as specified in FIPS 186, > while another signature(s) can be generated using different > schemes_, e.g., ones that are not currently specified in NIST > standards..._hybrid signatures can be accommodated by current > standards in FIPS mode, as defined in FIPS 140, provided at least > one of the component methods is a properly implemented, NIST- > approved signature algorithm_. For the purposes of FIPS 140 > validation, any signature that is generated by a non-approved > component scheme would not be considered a security function, > since the NIST-approved component is regarded as assuring the > validity of the hybrid signature. [NIST_PQC_FAQ] > ... > [NIST_PQC_FAQ] > National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), > "Post-Quantum Cryptography FAQs", 5 July 2022, > <https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/ > faqs>. > --> > > > 20) <!-- [rfced] We do not see "Generality" used elsewhere in Section 4. > Should it > be removed from the title of Figure 2? > > Original: > Figure 2: Generality / Need for Approval Spectrum > > Perhaps: > Figure 2: Need for Approval Spectrum > --> > > > 21) <!-- [rfced] Is "game" the correct word choice here? Or would "assumption" > (used earlier in the paragraph) be better? > > Original: > Namely, the most straightforward extension of the traditional EUF-CMA > security game would be that an adversary can request hybrid > signatures for messages of their choosing and succeeds if they are > able to produce a valid hybrid signature for a message that was not > part of an earlier request. > --> > > > 22) <!--[rfced] We are having difficulty parsing this sentence, particularly > "is > considered to be informally defined in the straightforward way as that an > adversary can request...". Please review and let us know how it may be > updated for clarity. > > Original: > Thus, if EUF-CMA security for hybrids is considered to be informally > defined in the straightfoward way as that an adversary can request > hybrid signatures for messages of their choosing and succeeds if they > are able to produce a valid hybrid signature for a message that was > not part of an earlier request, implicit requirements must hold in > order to avoid real-world implications. > > Perhaps: > Thus, if the straightforward EUF-CMA security assumption for hybrids is that > an adversary requests > hybrid signatures for messages of their choosing and succeeds if they > are able to produce a valid hybrid signature for a message that was > not part of an earlier request, implicit requirements must hold in > order to avoid real-world implications. > --> > > > 23) <!-- [rfced] Please review the relationship between "cross-protocol > attack" > and "component algorithm forgery" in the sentences below and let us know > if updates are needed for consistency. Also, in the last sentence below > (starts with "Otherwise"), perhaps "which can be seen as a type of > cross-protocol attack" can be removed as it is mentioned in the previous > sentence. > > Original: > such as cross-protocol attacks (e.g., component algorithm > forgeries). > ... > This is an > example of a component algorithm forgery, a.k.a. a case of cross- > algorithm attack or cross-protocol attack. > ... > Namely, either component > algorithm forgeries, a.k.a. cross-protocol attacks, must be out of > scope for the use case or the hybrid signature choice must be > strongly non-separable. Otherwise, component algorithm forgeries, > which can be seen as a type of cross-protocol attack, affect the type > of EUF-CMA properties offered ... > > Perhaps: > such as cross-protocol attacks (a.k.a. component algorithm > forgeries). > ... > This is an > example of a component algorithm forgery (a.k.a. cross- > algorithm attack or cross-protocol attack). > ... > Namely, either component > algorithm forgeries (a.k.a. cross-protocol attacks) must be out of > scope for the use case or the hybrid signature choice must be > strongly non-separable. Otherwise, component algorithm forgeries > affect the type of EUF-CMA properties offered ... > --> > > > 24) <!--[rfced] May we update "additional" to "in addition" in this sentence? > > Original: > Since the goal of backwards compatibility is > usually to allow legacy systems without any software change to be > able to process hybrid signatures, all differences between the legacy > signature format and the hybrid signature format must be allowed to > be ignored, including skipping verification of signatures additional > to the classical signature. > > Perhaps: > Since the goal of backwards compatibility is > usually to allow legacy systems without any software change to be > able to process hybrid signatures, all differences between the legacy > signature format and the hybrid signature format must be allowed to > be ignored, including skipping verification of signatures in addition > to the classical signature. > --> > > > 25) <!-- [rfced] This reference currently points to a paper made available via > Ronald L. Rivest's MIT faculty page. This paper is also available for > free on ACM Digital Library (which is likely more stable). Would you like > this reference to point to the version on ACM Digital Library or keep the > current version? > > Current: > [RSA] Rivest, R. L., Shamir, A., and L. Adleman, "A Method for > Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key > Cryptosystems", > <https://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/Rsapaper.pdf>. > > Perhaps: > [RSA] Rivest, R. L., Shamir, A., and L. Adleman, "A Method for > Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key > Cryptosystems", Communications of the ACM, vol. 21, no. 2, > pp. 120-126, DOI 10.1145/359340.359342, > <https://doi.org/10.1145/359340.359342>. > --> > > > 26) <!-- [rfced] We do not see "template" in ietf-tls-hybrid-design (RFC-to-be > 9954). Would another term be better here? > > Original: > This document is based on the template of > [I-D.ietf-tls-hybrid-design]. > > Perhaps: > This document is based on the hybrid key exchange > defined in [RFC9954]. > --> > > > 27) <!-- [rfced] Font styling > > a) Use of <tt> > > This file lists terms enclosed in <tt> in this document: > https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc9955-TT.txt > > Some of these terms appear both with and without <tt>. For example, we see > "[hybrid] signatures" and "[hybrid]" enclosed in <tt>, but we also see > instances of "[hybrid]" and "hybrid" without <tt>. Please review to ensure > the usage of <tt> is correct and consistent. Let us know if any updates are > needed using OLD/NEW format. > > Note: In the HTML and PDF outputs, <tt> yields fixed-width font. In the > TXT output, there is no change. > > b) Use of <em> > > This is only used in the direct quote in Section 4. The emphasis may be > difficult to see in the TXT output. Please review. > > Note: In the HTML and PDF outputs, <em> yields italics. In the TXT output, > <em> yields an underscore before and after. > --> > > > 28) <!-- [rfced] Terminology > > a) Should the four instances of "scale" in the document be updated to > "spectrum"? > > Current: > Non-separability is not a singular definition but rather is a scale, > representing degrees of separability hardness, visualized in > Figure 1. > ... > Third on the scale is the Strong Non-Separability notion, in which > separability detection is dependent on artifacts in the signature > itself. > ... > In this respect, there is a scale of approval that developers may > consider as to whether they are using at least one approved component > algorithm implementation ... > ... > We provide a scale for the different nuances of approval of the > hybrid combiners, where "approval" means that a software > implementation of a component algorithm can be used unmodified for > creation of the hybrid signature. > > > b) In Table 2, should instances of "cert" and "certs" be updates to > "certificate" and "certificates"? > > > c) The following terms are used in the document. Please review to ensure > consistent and correct usage. Let us know if any updates are needed. > > component message forgery attack > component algorithm forgery (and component algorithm forgeries) > component forgery (and component forgeries) > component forgery attacks > --> > > > 29) <!-- [rfced] Abbreviations > > a) FYI - We have added expansions for the following abbreviations > per Section 3.6 of RFC 7322 ("RFC Style Guide"). Please review each > expansion in the document carefully to ensure correctness. > > Great Multivariate Short Signature (GeMSS) > Learning With Errors (LWE) > Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) > Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) > > > b) Both the expansion and the acronym for the following terms are used > throughout the document. Would you like to update to using the expansion upon > first usage and the acronym for the rest of the document? > > Simultaneous Verification (SV) > Strong Non-Separability (SNS) > Weak Non-Separability (WNS) > --> > > > 30) <!-- [rfced] Please review the "Inclusive Language" portion of the online > Style Guide <https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/part2/#inclusive_language> > and let us know if any changes are needed. Updates of this nature typically > result in more precise language, which is helpful for readers. > > For example, please consider whether "black-box" should be updated. > > In addition, please consider whether "traditional" should be updated for > clarity. While the NIST website indicates that this term is potentially > biased, it is also ambiguous. "Traditional" is a subjective term, as it is > not the same for everyone. > > Link to NIST website: > https://web.archive.org/web/20250214092458/https://www.nist.gov/nist-research-library/nist-technical-series-publications-author-instructions#table1 > --> > > > Thank you. > > Alanna Paloma and Rebecca VanRheenen > RFC Production Center > > > > On Apr 3, 2026, at 9:48 AM, [email protected] wrote: > > *****IMPORTANT***** > > Updated 2026/04/03 > > RFC Author(s): > -------------- > > Instructions for Completing AUTH48 > > Your document has now entered AUTH48. 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