Hello All,

Something I hinted at earlier that I wanted to share more information about:  
Internet Explorer 8's new "Merged Frame 
Process<http://blogs.msdn.com/b/askie/archive/2009/03/13/clicking-on-the-blue-e-in-taskbar-does-not-launch-a-new-process-in-ie8.aspx>"
 technology will allow the latest web client login to overwrite the last, 
unless you take steps to stop this.  (Info on MFP here, in case you can't see 
the link above:  
http://blogs.msdn.com/b/askie/archive/2009/03/13/clicking-on-the-blue-e-in-taskbar-does-not-launch-a-new-process-in-ie8.aspx
 - h/t to )

One of Microsoft's stated goals was to use less resources by allowing one 
browser 'frame' process (the object that holds the parts around the tabs) to 
hold multiple tab sessions, and to not create a new frame if it didn't seem 
necessary.  The result is that if you open a web client URL and login (creating 
one active Remedy session w/cookies), then open a second web client URL (even 
in a different window) and login, the second login can overwrite the first's 
session.

For example, here's what I can do right now on a 7.6.4 system loaded with 
service desk and test data I am using to test for an upgrade:


1.)    Open browser window A, browse to ...login.jsp, login as "customer01" (a 
read-only account) - I see the IT Home page:  The greeting and status bar below 
say customer01.

2.)    Open browser window B, browse to ...login.jsp, login as "Allen" (an 
administrator account) - I see the IT Home page:  The greeting and status bar 
below say Allen.

3.)    Go back to browser window A now, open the 'Applications' quick menu, 
choose "Application Administration Console" - I see the administrator's 
console, and the status bar at the bottom now identifies the formerly read-only 
user as administrator Allen with a fixed license.  From this point on, window A 
operates with Allen's permissions.

Originally, this concerned me because it seemed to prevent a basic 
functionality of Remedy User that I use almost every day:  Opening multiple 
sessions with different logins to run different processes, monitor actions, 
troubleshoot issues, test user access, etc.  Fortunately, the link I provided 
above notes some workarounds:  I chose the command line option and created a 
desktop icon for IE with "-NoFrameMerging", as such
   "C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe" -NoFrameMerging 
http://YourMidTier:8080/arsys/shared/login.jsp?/arsys/home

So far, this is working and I can successfully run multiple sessions without 
them overwriting each other.  (This way you can still use the resource saving 
functionalities of the MFP.)

Now however, my concern is that this may be a security issue as well.  As I've 
noted above, even a read-only browser frame can be merged with another browser 
frame that has the highest permissions possible.  It seems to me that with a 
minimum of security barriers, someone with a fair knowledge of HTML and Java 
programming could gain administrative access by:

1.)     Get any login to the Remedy server - not a problem, many companies have 
read-only id/pws they freely distribute for self-service and the like.

2.)    Create a site that a Remedy administrator is likely to browse to and 
have up when logging in to the Remedy server.

3.)    Put code on that site that mimics the login.jsp (or calls it invisibly) 
using the known login, logs into the server to create a valid (read-only) 
session, and waits.

4.)    Remedy admin logs in, the read-only session gains administrator 
permissions, and it can now run any number of queries or other Remedy actions 
for as long as the administrator is logged in.

This of course is the most extreme, gaining admin access and putting the server 
in danger.  It would be even easier however to 'trojan' the larger number of 
regular users who have permissions to secure data (HIPAA, financial, military, 
etc) kept in Remedy to pull the data they have access to, and all actions would 
be, as far as Remedy was concerned, performed by the user during a valid login 
session.

BMC support's answer was that "since the Mid-tier tracks session based on two 
cookies which exist in the context of hitting the Mid-tier server, it is 
unclear how it'd be possible to obtain/use these cookies via a rouge (sic) 
website outside of this context, not to mention somehow authenticating as an 
administrator."

What do you think?  Is my scenario plausible?

I look forward to reading (and learning) more from you all on this!  :^)


Kelly Logan, Sr. Systems Administrator (Remedy), GMS
ProQuest | 789 E. Eisenhower Parkway, P.O. Box 1346 | Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 
USA | 734.997.4777
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
www.proquest.com

ProQuest...Start here. 2010 InformationWeek 500 Top Innovator

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