For an operational definition of consciousness, I would use the memory capacity of the agent as an upper bound. For the lower bound I could use Wolfram's 2 state 3 symbol Turing machine as the simplest known machine, but it is extremely difficult to program in practice. The input sometimes has to be an infinitely repeating pattern. A better choice would be a language like C because it's well known or brainfuck because it's simple. But Kolmogorov complexity is not computable regardless of language, so it doesn't matter.
A formal or operational definition of consciousness is mostly useful (or useless) for philosophical arguments like whether animals or computers or atoms are conscious. -- Matt Mahoney, [email protected] On Sun, Oct 18, 2026, 1:04 PM James Bowery <[email protected]> wrote: > Of course I wholeheartedly agree that choice of UTM isn't the bugaboo that > the pedantic twits make it out to be. Only it does matter in going from > formal to operational definitions because the operations of the UTM are > otherwise undefined. > > Presumably you would want some way of actually measuring the bits in what > we refer to as "reality". Nor do I suggest that you should abide by my > answer to said pedantic twits (NiNOR Complexity) since that answer is at > the same level of pedant discourse as is their "critique" of Kolmogorov > Complexity as information criterion for causal model selection. That said, > you are, of course, free to ignore my question regarding UTM as it is > deferrable until such time as you wish to measure your definition of > consciousness. > > On Sat, Oct 17, 2026 at 3:13 PM Matt Mahoney <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> I'm defining formal consciousness. For operational consciousness we just >> need to distinguish between neurological consciousness (being awake), >> subjective consciousness (not a zombie) and moral consciousness (can suffer >> and we should prevent it). My definition is closest to the first type >> because it has a physical explanation and is observable. The others are >> just opinions. I don't need to redefine them. >> >> I'm looking for criticisms and alternate suggestions for my formal >> definition. >> >> We can measure consciousness as the rate of conscious experience in bits >> per second. But it depends on the interval. In general, K(S3|S1) ≤ K(S2|S1) >> + K(S3|S2) because of forgetting. The rate is lower over longer intervals. >> In humans it's like 10 bits per second over 1 minute or 1 bit per second >> over a year. >> >> I don't define a UTM because Kolmogorov's proof of UTM independence still >> applies. In practice it is still useful even though Kolmogorov complexity >> is not computable regardless of UTM. >> >> -- Matt Mahoney, [email protected] >> >> On Sat, Oct 17, 2026, 3:08 PM James Bowery <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> "But feel free to offer an alternative definition." >>> >>> Presumably you are: >>> >>> 1) drawing a distinction between operational and formal definitions >>> and/or >>> 2) inviting others to contribute their might-be-hated definitions. >>> >>> BTW, I don't hate your formal definition but I'm curious how you propose >>> to select the UTM. I'm also going to presume that by "consciousness" you >>> mean the recurrent generation of "bits of conscious experience" as you >>> forward chain K(S2|S1) to K(S3|S2), etc. >>> >>> On Sat, Oct 17, 2026 at 1:17 PM Matt Mahoney <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Like Shane Legg did for intelligence, I offer a formal definition of >>>> consciousness. I define the number of bits of conscious experience by an >>>> agent in going from state S1 to S2 as K(S2|S1), where K is conditional >>>> Kolmogorov complexity, the length of the shortest program that outputs a >>>> description of S2 given S1 as input. >>>> >>>> This agrees with our intuitive definition of consciousness. Inanimate >>>> objects with no memory are not conscious. Plants are not conscious. Animals >>>> with large brains have more conscious experience than animals with small >>>> brains. Accumulated conscious experience increases over time. You have no >>>> conscious experience of anything you don't remember. >>>> >>>> You can hate my definition but you have to accept the fact that I have >>>> defined it. >>>> >>>> Why might you hate it. Because: >>>> 1. There is no distinction between positive and negative reinforcement. >>>> Both result in a change in behavior that can be measured in bits. >>>> 2. Computers are conscious. When you download a 1 GB text file, the >>>> computer has as much conscious experience as you do in a lifetime. >>>> 3. Your total conscious experience since birth after you die is 0. >>>> 4. Consciousness does not require or imply paranormal perception. >>>> >>>> But feel free to offer an alternative definition. >>>> >>>> -- Matt Mahoney, [email protected] >>>> >>>> On Sat, Oct 17, 2026, 11:23 AM James Bowery <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, Oct 16, 2026 at 6:49 PM Matt Mahoney <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ... >>>>>> >>>>>> Anyway, it is not clear to me why you would define consciousness this >>>>>> way. What purpose does it serve? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> To quote Shane Legg's Singularity Summit presentation on measures of >>>>> machine intelligence: >>>>> >>>>> https://youtu.be/0ghzG14dT-w?t=1155 >>>>> >>>>> "I've given you an equation that even if you HATE my definition, you >>>>> have to accept the fact that I've actually defined it formally and said >>>>> exactly what I mean. I think that's a very good start. At least we can >>>>> argue on that basis." (applause) >>>>> >>>>> Use "operationally" in place of "formally", and accept that Ed May >>>>> hasn't been a PhD advisor to anyone like Shane Legg who could write a >>>>> thesis that would undoubtedly survey "definitions" of "consciousness" much >>>>> better than anyone heretofore has bothered with, thence to provide a >>>>> taxonomy of such definitions into which something like the operational >>>>> definition I've proposed can reside and maybe we can start to have a >>>>> collegial discourse. >>>>> >>>>> As to the "purpose" such an operational definition might serve, how >>>>> about this: >>>>> >>>>> Finding a place for the very concept of "purpose" itself in our >>>>> discourse, in that the so-called "time-reversibility" of the laws of >>>>> physics may embody what the Greeks called "Telos" for "final cause" -- >>>>> rather than the folks endlessly yammering about "AI Alignment" are, >>>>> themselves, "conscious" of at present. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> https://web.archive.org/web/20150925072222/http://www.boundaryinstitute.org/bi/EtterPubs.htm >>>>> >>>>> Etter was the colleague I mentioned previously who also arrived early >>>>> with Solomonoff at the 1956 Dartmouth summer workshop, but because his >>>>> family was independently wealthy, never had to genuflect to what Pirsig >>>>> called "The Church of Reason" and its travesty of Newton's yeoman farmer >>>>> homestead with The Church's "tenure" as the path to independent thought as >>>>> the foundation of scientific revolutions -- independent thought once you'd >>>>> been brainwashed and effectively castrated. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *Artificial General Intelligence List > <https://agi.topicbox.com/latest>* / AGI / see discussions > <https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi> + participants > <https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/members> + delivery options > <https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/subscription> Permalink > <https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/T2784bbfe524b0b93-M00a40f3708ad6c9e66a010e1> > ------------------------------------------ Artificial General Intelligence List: AGI Permalink: https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/T2784bbfe524b0b93-M24a80fd69f50366775248751 Delivery options: https://agi.topicbox.com/groups/agi/subscription
